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SOVEREIGN PREEMPTION STATE STANDING 
Jonathan Remy Nash 
ABSTRACT—When does a state have standing to challenge the Executive 
Branch’s alleged underenforcement of federal law? The issue took on 
importance during the Obama Administration, with “red states” suing the 
Executive Branch over numerous issues, including immigration and health 
care. The question of state standing has already appeared in important 
litigation during the first months of the Trump Administration, only with 
the political orientation of the actors reversed. 
This Article argues in favor of sovereign preemption state standing, 
under which a state would enjoy Article III standing to sue the federal 
government when (1) the federal government preempts state law in an area, 
yet (2) the Executive Branch allegedly underenforces the federal law that 
Congress enacted to address that very same area. Sovereign preemption 
state standing arises naturally out of the function of states in the federal 
system. It is grounded upon parens patriae injury—that is, injury to the 
state’s ability to protect its citizens against harm. The federal government 
can properly preempt state law, on the logic that it then assumes from the 
state the obligation to protect the state’s citizens from harm. Where the 
Executive Branch then fails adequately to enforce federal law, it leaves the 
state’s citizens unprotected. The state then has Article III standing to sue 
the federal government on behalf of its citizenry. 
The universe of cases where sovereign preemption state standing 
operates is not large, which should assuage concerns over opening the 
floodgates of state–federal litigation. Moreover, prudential doctrines can be 
overlaid such that more cases would be screened out. Although sovereign 
preemption state standing could conceivably extend to Executive Branch 
overenforcement, such an application would not square with the functional 
justification for the doctrine. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What standard must a state meet to establish proper standing in federal 
court to sue the United States? The traditional test for Article III standing 
calls for plaintiffs to establish an “injury in fact.”1 Most plaintiffs assert an 
economic injury in fact. Yet, while states sometimes can rest a lawsuit on a 
valid economic injury,2 often the types of complaints states have—and 
hence the injuries they can allege—are not economic. Rather, these injuries 
may go to the states’ very sovereignty and ability to protect their citizens. 
Such noneconomic injuries are perhaps especially likely to abound where 
states assert alleged injuries suffered at the hands of the federal 
government. 
The Supreme Court has, over time, allowed states greater berth in 
suing the federal government. It has recognized the standing of states to sue 
for direct constitutional injuries allegedly imposed by action of the federal 
 
 1 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The standard test for standing 
includes two other elements as well: causation and redressability. See id. at 560–61; infra notes 39–44 
and accompanying text. 
 2 See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 253 (1972) (suit—ultimately 
unsuccessful on the merits—under the antitrust laws for damages state suffered in its “proprietary 
capacity”). 
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government.3 And, while it has never directly so held, its cases can be read 
to support the normatively desirable notion that states have standing to 
challenge the validity of preemption of their laws by the federal 
government.4 
Yet, with the tremendous growth of federal administrative agencies, 
states may suffer injuries at the hands of the federal government that 
neither of these lines of cases cover. Regulatory actions by the Obama 
Administration wound up prompting federal lawsuits by collections of so-
called “red states,” with the states arguing that the Executive Branch was 
not enforcing the laws as Congress had written them.5 And, as shown by 
state challenges to President Trump’s executive orders on immigration, it 
appears that “blue states” stand ready to employ a similar strategy against 
the Trump Administration.6 
The important question thus arises: Does a state have standing to raise 
a claim that the Executive Branch is underenforcing the law as enacted by 
Congress? Here, the muddled state of the law provides no clear path to 
state standing. Much of this confusion stems from the Supreme Court’s 
2007 opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA.7 There, the Court held that the State 
of Massachusetts had standing to challenge the U.S. EPA’s refusal—and 
assertion of an absence of statutory power—to regulate greenhouse gas 
tailpipe emissions.8 The five-Justice majority concluded that, as sovereigns, 
states enjoy “special solicitude” in the standing calculus.9 Yet the actual 
role that sovereignty played in the Court’s conclusion remains murky. 
Despite the Court’s recitation of sovereignty as a factor in its analysis, the 
Court, in the end, emphasized Massachusetts’s ownership of coastal 
property—property that would disappear if the predicted effects of climate 
 
 3 See infra Section I.C.3.a. 
 4 See Tara Leigh Grove, When Can a State Sue the United States?, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 
880–85 (2016) (relying upon, among other cases, Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), and 
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006), to conclude that a state has standing to challenge preemption 
of its law by the federal government). 
 5 See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (challenge by states to Executive Branch 
enforcement of the federal immigration laws); see also infra notes 12–22 and accompanying text 
(discussing the case). 
 6 See Adam Nagourney, Expecting Trouble, California Picks Up Some Legal Muscle, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 5, 2017, at A14 (“Girding for four years of potential battles with President-elect Donald J. Trump, 
Democratic leaders of the California Legislature announced . . . that they had hired Eric H. Holder Jr., 
who was attorney general under President Obama, to represent them in any legal fights against the new 
Republican White House.”); Vivian Yee, To Combat Trump, Democrats Look to G.O.P. Tactic: 
Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2016, at A1. 
 7 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 8 Id. at 518–19. 
 9 Id. at 520. 
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change came to pass—as the basis for finding that Massachusetts had 
standing.10 The actual basis on which the Court rested Massachusetts’s 
standing thus seems like a traditional economic, not sovereignty-based, 
injury. On this reading, the “special solicitude” that the majority afforded 
states goes not to any aspect of state sovereignty as such but rather reduces 
the stringency of the ordinary—and still applicable—economic standard 
test for injury.11 
The current state of the law thus puts states seeking to sue the United 
States in the difficult position of trying either (1) to shoehorn what 
probably is not a traditional economic injury into that pigeonhole; (2) to 
assert an injury to sovereignty based on precedent that provides only 
limited, and murky, support for the validity of such an injury in the 
standing inquiry; or (3) both. The law thus remains unclear and 
impoverished in terms of the bases on which states have standing to sue in 
federal court. 
This perplexing post-Massachusetts v. EPA landscape has shaped 
efforts by states to challenge the federal government’s approach to 
immigration enforcement. Numerous states—including most prominently 
the State of Texas12—attempted to establish standing to contest 
implementation of a directive issued by the Department of Homeland 
Security.13 The directive—Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and 
Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA)14—was designed to provide parents 
of citizens and lawful permanent U.S. residents legal presence within the 
United States.15 Texas claimed it had standing to pursue the challenge to 
 
 10 Id. at 522–23. 
 11 See id. at 539 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 12 Twenty-five other States joined the complaint. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 
2015), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). However, insofar as “the presence of 
one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement,” Rumsfeld 
v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006), the conclusion by the 
district court and court of appeals that Texas had standing was a sufficient basis to conclude that federal 
court standing was proper over the entire case. For ease of exposition, I refer in the text solely to 
Texas’s arguments in favor of standing. 
 13 See Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 604 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th 
Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
 14 See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t Homeland Sec., to León Rodríguez, 
Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to 
Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Who 
Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents 4–5 (Nov. 20, 2014), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EN7A-W3FT]. 
 15 More precisely, the Department of Homeland Security sought to expand an earlier directive and 
implement a new directive. In 2012, the Department implemented the Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals program (DACA), under which the Department would exercise its prosecutorial discretion and 
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DAPA because it would have to issue driver’s licenses to DAPA 
beneficiaries. Consistent with the muddled jurisprudence, Texas spun this 
basis for standing—and the courts below accepted this basis for standing—
as both economic and sovereignty based. For example, the lower courts 
expressly found that the issuance of new driver’s licenses would impose on 
Texas a cost of at least “several million dollars.”16 At the same time, the 
appeals court found that the need to issue new driver’s licenses also 
qualified as an injury to state sovereignty, reasoning that “DAPA affects 
the states’ ‘quasi-sovereign’ interests by imposing substantial pressure on 
them to change their laws, which provide for issuing driver’s licenses to 
some aliens and subsidizing those licenses.”17 
While the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the decision below by 
tie vote without opinion,18 the dialogue during oral argument in the case 
amply demonstrates similar attempts to cast Texas’s injury as alternatively 
economic and sovereignty based. The Texas Solicitor General explained: 
“First, we’re raising financial harms from our own State’s fisc. That’s not a 
parens patriae. And we’re also raising sovereign harms, and that’s 
Massachusetts v. EPA. We have ceded to the Federal government the 
authority to determine who’s lawfully present within the borders of the 26 
States.”19 
Oral argument also confirmed profound confusion over whether the 
Massachusetts v. EPA opinion’s invocation of the states’ entitlement to 
“special solicitude” meant that standing was based on economic or 
sovereignty-based injury. As noted just above, the Texas Solicitor General 
considered Massachusetts to have dealt with states’ sovereignty interests. 
In response to a reference by Chief Justice John Roberts to “special 
solicitude” in Massachusetts v. EPA, the attorney for the intervenors 
(individuals claiming uncertainty as a result of the invalidation of DAPA) 
stated: “In that case, it was not a financial claim . . . . [I]t was a claim 
related to the State’s quasi-sovereign interest over land.”20 And Justice 
 
defer immigration enforcement as to certain young people on a case-by-case basis, provided that they 
passed background checks. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d at 146–47. Then, in 2014, the 
Department implemented DAPA. DAPA both (1) expanded the pool of people eligible for treatment 
under DACA and extended the time period in which enforcement would be deferred, and (2) created the 
new DAPA program that would extend treatment similar to DACA to certain parents of U.S. citizens 
and lawful permanent residents. See id. at 146–49. 
 16 Id. at 155 (quoting Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 617). 
 17 Id. at 153. 
 18 United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
 19 Transcript of Oral Argument at 62–63, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-
674). 
 20 Id. at 40. 
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Stephen Breyer asserted: “[A]s far as Massachusetts is concerned . . . that 
was their own coastline. And that’s not money. That’s the physical territory 
belonging to Massachusetts. And, of course, they have standing to protect 
that.”21 These statements are consistent with a sovereignty-based 
understanding of Massachusetts. In contrast, the U.S. Solicitor General 
seemed to understand Massachusetts as simply expanding the existing basis 
for standing, i.e., standing based on economic injury. When Chief Justice 
Roberts asked how the injury in the case at bar was “any more indirect and 
speculative” than the injury in Massachusetts v. EPA, the U.S. Solicitor 
General explained: “States got special solicitude and were allowed to sue in 
a manner where, under Article III, they normally wouldn’t be able to sue.”22 
The efforts by judges and advocates to fit Texas’s driver’s license 
injury into the economic pigeonhole for standing (even as arguably 
expanded by Massachusetts’s special solicitude) or into the pure 
sovereignty-based pigeonhole is a misguided exercise. But it is the 
inexorable result of the Court’s muddled precedent. 
In this Article, I advance a blueprint for what I term “sovereign 
preemption state standing” to sue the federal government. Sovereign 
preemption state standing is, I argue, consistent with the Court’s precedents 
and serves to clarify them. It rests upon an injury that is neither economic 
nor purely sovereign; rather, it is a form of quasi-sovereign—or “parens 
patriae”—injury.23 A state asserts a parens patriae injury on behalf of its 
citizenry. Here, that injury arises from a combination of (1) the Executive 
Branch underenforcing federal statutory law, and (2) the federal 
government actively preempting state law. 
More specifically, sovereign preemption state standing arises when, at 
a minimum, the following conditions are met. First, the state must allege 
that the Executive Branch has underenforced the federal law in a way that 
is inconsistent with a governing statute. Second, the state must be able to 
point to preemption of state law; in particular, either the preemption of state 
law must be obvious and clear from a federal statute or the federal 
government must have previously sought, or be concurrently seeking, to 
preempt state law. In addition, there must be a nexus between the area of 
preemption and the area in which the Executive Branch is allegedly 
underenforcing federal law. 
Sovereign preemption state standing arises naturally out of the 
function of states in the federal system. The Constitution recognizes the 
 
 21 Id. at 62. 
 22 Id. at 18. 
 23 “Parens patriae” is Latin for “parent of the country.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico 
ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982). 
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continuing importance of states and preserves much of the states’ police 
power authority.24 The Constitution thus validates the ongoing role of states 
in protecting the health and well-being of their citizens.25 A state cannot 
fulfill this role when the federal government preempts state law; still, the 
state’s citizens receive protection if the federal government puts in place a 
federal law to fill the void left by the preemption of state law. Indeed, the 
constitutional logic is that the federal government acts in the stead of the 
state governments to protect the nation’s citizenry. In effect, the state 
government and the federal government both have parens patriae status; 
either can validly protect the interest of the people. A state has no 
sovereign preemption standing to challenge the mere fact that the federal 
government has opted to supersede the state as regulatory parens patriae on 
a particular issue.26 
However, this logic breaks down when, notwithstanding Congress’s 
decision to put in place a federal law, the Executive Branch underenforces 
that law.27 Now, the state can argue that the federal government is not 
properly exercising the protective power that the state effectively delegated 
to the federal government under the Constitution. And the injury to its 
citizenry that results from that underenforcement creates the state’s basis 
for sovereign preemption state standing. 
Sovereign preemption state standing broadly aligns with prior 
precedent governing state standing to sue the federal government.28 
Additionally, it leaves undisturbed the view—recognized by Professors 
Ann Woolhandler and Michael Collins and by Professor Stephen 
Vladeck—that a state should have standing to sue the national government 
for a direct injury it has suffered.29 And it is consistent with the conception 
 
 24 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2086 (2014) (“In our federal system, the 
National Government possesses only limited powers; the States and the people retain the remainder. 
The States have broad authority to enact legislation for the public good—what we have often called a 
‘police power.’”) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995)). 
 25 See id. 
 26 See infra Section II.C.2 (discussing the possibility of extending sovereign preemption state 
standing to settings of Executive Branch overenforcement of federal statutory law). 
Furthermore, sovereign preemption state standing can be contracted or expanded by making the nexus 
requirement—that is, the degree to which the area of state law preempted by the federal government 
aligns with the area of law allegedly underenforced by the Executive Branch—more or less exacting. 
See infra Section II.C.1. 
 27 The Executive Branch might argue that it is not systematically underenforcing the federal 
statutory scheme but that it is simply judiciously exercising prosecutorial discretion. Such an argument 
might be a valid defense on the merits but would not defeat sovereign preemption state standing based 
upon a state’s allegation of underenforcement. 
 28 See infra Section II.B. 
 29 See Stephen I. Vladeck, States’ Rights and State Standing, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 845, 857–65 
(2012); Ann Woolhandler, Governmental Sovereignty Actions, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 209, 217–
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of standing, advanced by Professor Tara Leigh Grove, that allows a state to 
challenge the validity of federal government preemption of state law.30 
Sovereign preemption state standing provides the next logical step: It 
provides standing where, even if the preemption is valid, the Executive 
Branch fails to enforce the federal law that takes the place of preempted 
state law. Sovereign preemption state standing thus provides what other 
theories do not: a consistent logical lens through which to view the Court’s 
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA. 
My understanding of a sovereign injury sufficient to confer on a state 
standing to sue the federal government differs substantially from—
although it is not necessarily entirely incompatible with—the approach 
taken by some other scholars on this issue. As noted just above, it is 
consistent with Professor Grove’s advocacy of state standing to sue over 
the validity of federal government preemption of state law.31 However, it 
conflicts with Professor Grove’s argument that states lack standing to 
challenge problems of horizontal separation of powers.32 Sovereign 
preemption state standing also bears no logical relationship to Professor 
Shannon Roesler’s argument that a state’s standing to sue the federal 
government should turn on whether the state’s suit challenges a federal 
program that includes the states in its administration.33 While theoretically 
my approach can coexist with Professor Roesler’s, the analysis below 
suggests that the two theories provide standing in largely nonoverlapping 
sets of cases.34 In other words, operation of both theories would admit 
numerous cases into the federal courts. 
The universe of cases where sovereign preemption state standing 
operates is not large, which should assuage commentators—like Professors 
Woolhandler and Collins and Professor Vladeck—who favor limiting the 
bases on which states can sue the federal government.35 Moreover, courts 
could overlay prudential doctrines—that is, subconstitutional standing 
 
18 (2014); Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 493–94 
(1995). 
 30 See Grove, supra note 4, at 880–85. 
 31 See supra text accompanying note 30. 
 32 See Grove, supra note 4, at 885–99 (arguing that states lack standing to sue over the federal 
Executive’s enforcement of federal law because, by virtue of the Executive’s action, the states suffer no 
injury different from any other member of society). 
 33 See Shannon M. Roesler, State Standing to Challenge Federal Authority in the Modern 
Administrative State, 91 WASH. L. REV. 637, 677–702 (2016). 
 34 See infra notes 207–09 and accompanying text. 
 35 See Vladeck, supra note 29, at 874; Woolhandler, supra note 29, at 236; Woolhandler & Collins, 
supra note 29, at 490–93. 
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doctrines36—on top of sovereign preemption so that more cases would be 
screened out.37 Alternatively, courts could also construe sovereign 
preemption state standing somewhat more broadly so that it applies not 
only to the setting of Executive Branch underenforcement, but to the 
setting of horizontal federal disagreement in general—i.e., to the setting of 
Executive Branch overenforcement as well.38 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets out the basics of relevant 
standing doctrine, including the standing of states. It highlights the 
shortcomings and confusion in the existing law governing state standing to 
sue the United States. Part II turns to sovereign preemption state standing. 
It first derives the doctrine from the function of states under the 
constitutional design. Second, it demonstrates its consistency with existing 
precedent. Next, it considers possible nuances in the application of the 
doctrine. Last, it explores how sovereign preemption state standing might, 
and might not, apply in actual federal court cases (and in one hypothetical 
case). 
I. EXISTING STANDING DOCTRINE 
This Part explores the jurisprudence governing state standing to sue 
the federal government. Section A begins with a brief overview of 
traditional standing jurisprudence—that is, the rules governing standing in 
a typical case where the plaintiff is not a state and the defendant is not (or 
need not be) the federal government or a federal actor. Section B narrows 
the focus by looking at the standing of states to invoke the jurisdiction of 
the federal courts. Section C narrows the focus further still by examining 
the Supreme Court’s treatment of standing where a state has tried to sue the 
federal government. Finally, Section D surveys the state of the law as other 
commentators have tried to crystallize it. 
A. Overview of Traditional Standing Jurisprudence 
Standing limits the ability of litigants to litigate, and in particular for 
plaintiffs to bring lawsuits, in the federal courts. Standing consists of two 
components. Its core, “constitutional standing,” emanates from Article III 
 
 36 See Jonathan Remy Nash, A Functional Theory of Congressional Standing, 114 MICH. L. REV. 
339, 346 (2015). But see Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386–
87 (2014) (explaining that some standing requirements to which the Court previously had referred as 
“prudential” were better understood as statutory requirements for standing). 
 37 See infra Section II.C.4 (discussing the application of the bar against “generalized grievances,” 
the requirement that Congress have created a statutory cause of action, and the “political question 
doctrine” to cases where sovereign preemption state standing otherwise might inhere). 
 38 See infra text accompanying notes 87–90 (discussing cases where the Supreme Court found that 
states lacked standing when they raised “competing parens patriae” claims). 
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of the Constitution. In addition, other doctrines—some constitutional and 
some subconstitutional (or prudential)39—further empower federal courts to 
decline to recognize the standing of certain plaintiffs to bring lawsuits 
against certain defendants in certain circumstances. 
The Supreme Court has made clear that the Constitution requires a 
plaintiff to make three showings in order establish proper Article III 
standing: (1) “injury in fact,” (2) a causal link between that injury and the 
conduct complained of, and (3) redressability.40 The “injury in fact” prong 
demands that the plaintiff show that he or she has suffered “an invasion of 
a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) 
‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.”’”41 Causation 
requires the plaintiff to establish that the injury resulted from the action of 
the defendant and not from independent action by a third party.42 Finally, 
the “redressability” prong requires a plaintiff to show that it is “‘likely,’ as 
opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a 
favorable decision.’”43 From the plaintiff’s perspective, the “injury in fact” 
prong “drives the standing analysis.”44 
B. The Supreme Court and State Standing 
In their exhaustive study of state standing, Professors Woolhandler 
and Collins highlight the limited number and categories of cases in which 
states historically had standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts.45 They delineate how, through the nineteenth century, a state had 
standing to sue where either (1) the state sought legal help to resolve a state 
interest truly sovereign in nature (such as resolving a boundary dispute), or 
(2) the state asserted a common law claim.46 Professors Woolhandler and 
Collins conclude that beyond the Republic’s first century, except for state 
sovereignty interests, states enjoyed no basis for standing in federal court 
beyond what was available to ordinary nonstate litigants.47 In other words, 
 
 39 See supra note 36. 
 40 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 41 Id. at 560 (footnote and citations omitted) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 
(1990)). 
 42 Id. at 560–61. 
 43 Id. at 561 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 43 (1976)). 
 44 Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing’s Expected Value, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1283, 1304 (2013); see 
supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 45 See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 29. 
 46 See id. at 406–34. 
 47 Emphasizing the importance of historical context in interpreting some cases as well as the 
frequency of boundary dispute cases in the Court’s original jurisdiction, Professor Shannon Roesler 
reads the early cases not to present the same degree of hostility to sovereign-based state standing that 
Professors Woolhandler and Collins suggest. See Roesler, supra note 33, at 644–49. 
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courts were more likely to find standing where an intergovernmental 
lawsuit bore resemblance to a traditional suit at common law. 
The early years of the twentieth century saw the Court begin to loosen 
slightly the barrier against states litigating sovereign interests in federal 
court48 such that “the Court no longer necessarily relied on the common law 
to decide the merits of intergovernmental disputes.”49 Highlighted by a 
string of state “public nuisance” cases50 brought before the Supreme Court 
in the early twentieth century,51 the Court opened the door slightly to 
allowing states to seek to vindicate their quasi-sovereign—sometimes 
called parens patriae—interests.52 
Exactly what constitutes a quasi-sovereign interest remains murky. 
The clearest exposition of the scope of quasi-sovereignty came in the 1982 
case of Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez.53 There, 
Puerto Rico (which, the Court stated, was “similarly situated” to a state in 
terms of its ability to rely on quasi-sovereign interests to invoke federal 
court jurisdiction54) sought to invoke its parens patriae rights on behalf of 
its citizens, arguing that apple growers in Virginia had failed to comply 
with federal law that required employers to give hiring preference to Puerto 
Ricans over temporary foreign workers.55 The Court took the opportunity to 
enumerate the various types of interests on which states might rely to 
establish federal court standing. First, “sovereign interests” include (1) “the 
exercise of sovereign power over individuals and entities within the 
relevant jurisdiction,” which “involves the power to create and enforce a 
legal code, both civil and criminal”; and (2) “the demand for recognition 
from other sovereigns,” which “most frequently . . . involves the 
maintenance and recognition of borders.”56 Second, a state may advance 
nonsovereign “proprietary interests” and “private interests.”57 In this 
 
 48 See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 29, at 446–64. 
 49 Id. at 455. 
 50 In a public nuisance case, a state seeks to vindicate public interests by enjoining a public 
nuisance on the grounds of harms to its citizens’ health, safety, and economic welfare. See id. at 411. 
 51 See, e.g., Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 
(1906); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901). 
 52 See, e.g., Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. at 237 (“This is a suit by a State for an injury to it in its 
capacity of quasi-sovereign. In that capacity the State has an interest independent of and behind the 
titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain.”). 
 53 458 U.S. 592 (1982). 
 54 Id. at 608 n.15 (“[T]he Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is similarly situated to a State in this 
respect: It has a claim to represent its quasi-sovereign interests in federal court at least as strong as that 
of any State.”). 
 55 See id. at 594–96. 
 56 Id. at 601. 
 57 Id. at 601–02. 
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capacity, the state sues much as would a typical nonsovereign litigant 
(along the lines of Professors Woolhandler and Collins’ historical finding 
of ample actions by states based on the common law).58 
The Alfred L. Snapp Court then turned its attention to quasi-sovereign 
interests, which “consist of a set of interests that the State has in the well-
being of its populace.”59 In order to maintain an action based on a quasi-
sovereign interest, “the State must articulate an interest apart from the 
interests of particular private parties, i.e., the State must be more than a 
nominal party. The State must express a quasi-sovereign interest.”60 The 
Court then identified two “general categories” of cases into which 
successful quasi-sovereign cases (thus far) had fallen: (1) cases where “a 
State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being—both 
physical and economic—of its residents in general”; and (2) cases where “a 
State has a quasi-sovereign interest in not being discriminatorily denied its 
rightful status within the federal system.”61 Although the Court did not 
consider whether there might be additional categories of quasi-sovereign 
interests, it reaffirmed its earlier cases recognizing that states can invoke 
the protection of the federal courts on the basis of quasi-sovereign interests. 
Thus, by the modern era, the Court had recognized that states had a right to 
sue for common law injuries, sovereign interests, and a few categories of 
quasi-sovereign interests. 
C. The Supreme Court and State Standing to Sue the Federal Government 
I turn now to the narrower topic that is the focus of my analysis: the 
standing of states to sue the federal government (as opposed to any other 
defendant). I address the issue in the context of three time periods—the 
nineteenth century, the first half of the twentieth century, and recent years. 
I canvas three types of injuries that plaintiff states have asserted—injury to 
sovereignty interests, direct injury, and injury to quasi-sovereignty 
interests—and the extent to which the Court accepted those injuries as a 
 
 58 The Court explained: 
Two kinds of nonsovereign interests are to be distinguished. First, like other associations and 
private parties, a State is bound to have a variety of proprietary interests. A State may, for 
example, own land or participate in a business venture. As a proprietor, it is likely to have the 
same interests as other similarly situated proprietors. And like other such proprietors it may at 
times need to pursue those interests in court. Second, a State may, for a variety of reasons, attempt 
to pursue the interests of a private party, and pursue those interests only for the sake of the real 
party in interest. Interests of private parties are obviously not in themselves sovereign interests, 
and they do not become such simply by virtue of the State’s aiding in their achievement. In such 
situations, the State is no more than a nominal party. 
Id. at 601–02. 
 59 Id. at 602. 
 60 Id. at 607. 
 61 Id. 
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basis for standing. While the Court initially disfavored suits by states 
against the federal government as a general matter and continued to view 
injuries to sovereign interests with suspicion, it eventually recognized 
standing based on allegation of direct injuries. Its evaluation of injuries to 
state quasi-sovereignty interests as a basis for standing to sue the federal 
government remains murky. 
1. Nineteenth Century 
Historically, the Supreme Court disfavored suits by states against the 
federal government. Two early original jurisdiction cases arose out of 
efforts by Southern states to put a halt to Reconstruction. In the first, 
Mississippi v. Johnson, the Court (though it ultimately declined to hear the 
case on the merits) seemed open to the idea that “in some cases . . . such a 
bill may be filed against the United States.”62 In the other case—Georgia v. 
Stanton63—the Court’s rejection of the State’s standing seemed more 
absolute. Citing cases where states had filed suit as plaintiffs (but not 
against a federal government actor), and harkening back to the notion that 
only actions grounded in common law were generally allowed to move 
forward, the Court emphasized that the complaint called “for the judgment 
of the court upon political questions, and, upon rights not of persons or 
property, but of a political character.”64 In short, whatever the reason, the 
Court was reluctant to recognize state standing to sue the federal 
government in this era. 
2. The Early Twentieth Century 
The first part of the twentieth century was a time of transition in 
standing law.65 Simplifying the history here for purposes of a concise 
narrative, legal initiatives by progressive interest groups and lawyers 
sought to establish regulation of economic transactions in order to expand 
 
 62 71 U.S. 475, 501 (1866) (“It is true that a State may file an original bill in this court. And it may 
be true, in some cases, that such a bill may be filed against the United States. But we are fully satisfied 
that this court has no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official 
duties; and that no such bill ought to be received by us.”). 
 63 73 U.S. 50 (1867). 
 64 Id. at 77. The Court stated: 
That these matters, both as stated in the body of the bill, and, in the prayers for relief, call for the 
judgment of the court upon political questions, and, upon rights not of persons or property, but of 
a political character, will hardly be denied. For the rights for the protection of which our authority 
is invoked, are the rights of sovereignty, of political jurisdiction, of government, of corporate 
existence as a State, with all its constitutional powers and privileges. No case of private rights or 
private property infringed, or in danger of actual or threatened infringement, is presented by the 
bill, in a judicial form, for the judgment of the court. 
Id. 
 65 See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 29, at 469 (“This era for standing therefore was more 
transitional than is usually supposed . . . .”). 
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personal liberties and rights. In turn, this prompted evolution in the law of 
federal court standing.66 Perhaps recognizing the likely growth of lawsuits 
advancing personal rights and liberties, the Court sought to cull that growth 
by developing more specific, and restrictive, standards for litigant standing: 
As lawsuits began to move away from their common law moorings, the 
Court responded by starting to develop the modern test for standing. In 
many senses, that test seeks to ensure that lawsuits have at least a 
substantial resemblance to suits at common law by emphasizing the 
importance of economic injury caused by the defendant.67 Still, the Court 
designed its approach to stem, not to stop, the tide of cases alleging 
categories of injuries not previously welcomed in the courts. 
Like other litigants, states sought to take advantage of the Court’s 
growing openness to recognize injuries not typically seen at common law. 
One can see in the Supreme Court’s cases three types of injuries advanced 
by states: (1) truly sovereign interests (like those advanced by the Southern 
states challenging Reconstruction); (2) direct interests (like those advanced 
in boundary cases); and (3) quasi-sovereign (or parens patriae) interests. 
Indeed, much like (as described in the Introduction) Texas tried to frame its 
injury in its recent immigration challenge in multiple ways, the states 
sometimes raised more than one type of interest in a case (with varying 
degrees of success).68 The following Sections address the Court’s treatment 
of each type of interest in turn.69 
 
 66 Beyond the realm of the law of standing, the Court generally clung to the notion that the Due 
Process Clause protects economic, but not personal, rights and liberties. See, e.g., James E. Fleming, 
Fidelity, Basic Liberties, and the Specter of Lochner, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 147, 149 (1999). 
 67 See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 29, at 466–69. 
 68 See, e.g., id. at 491 n.420 (noting that the Florida v. Mellon Court “attempt[ed] to maintain a line 
between direct and indirect injuries”) (citing 273 U.S. 12, 18 (1927)). The assertion of various types of 
injuries makes it important to keep track of which type of injury the Court is addressing at which point. 
For example, while Professor Vladeck correctly notes that Texas v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 
258 U.S. 158 (1922), saw a state raise a standing argument “comparable” to the one raised in 
Massachusetts v. Mellon, Vladeck, supra note 29, at 852–53, the State based that comparable claim on 
its sovereign interest, not the quasi-sovereign argument for which Massachusetts v. Mellon is widely 
known. See infra text accompanying notes 71–74. 
 69 Insofar as states often tried to frame their injuries so as to resemble multiple paradigmatic 
interests, a single case sometimes appears in more than one Section. Some commentators have argued 
that the restrictions on standing we observe in many of the Supreme Court cases I survey are actually a 
feature not of Article III standing but of equitable considerations that attend the invocation of the 
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. See, e.g., Grove, supra note 4, at 868–69 (“[T]he Court’s original 
cases do not undermine state standing to assert such interests in federal district court, or on appeal to the 
Supreme Court.”); Roesler, supra note 33, at 650, 654; Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 29, at 489 
(footnote omitted) (“Over time, the Court developed certain principles to exclude cases from its original 
jurisdiction, even though that jurisdiction theoretically could be invoked as a matter of right. Some of 
these principles prohibit state-as-plaintiff litigation of certain claims altogether, whereas others allow 
states to sue in lower courts.”); infra note 82 (noting a statement to this effect by the Supreme Court). 
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a. Injury to sovereign interests 
The Court treated arguments that a state’s truly sovereign interests—
that is, its ability to enact and enforce its own laws—gave rise to federal 
court standing the same way that it had a half century earlier in the 
Reconstruction cases: The Court declined to proceed, describing the claims 
as nonjusticiable political questions.70 
In the 1922 case of Texas v. Interstate Commerce Commission,71 the 
State sought to challenge provisions of the Transportation Act of 1920 on 
the ground that Congress exceeded its constitutional authority in enacting 
them. The Court rejected Texas’s assertion of its sovereign interests as the 
basis for standing.72 The argument by the State in the 1923 case of 
Massachusetts v. Mellon73—raising a challenge to a federal statute (the 
Sheppard–Towner (Maternity) Act of 1921) that tied federal funding to 
state spending to reduce infant and maternal mortality—met a similar fate.74 
Likewise, in the 1926 case of New Jersey v. Sargent,75 the Court again 
rejected the State’s sovereignty-based standing arguments. Here the State 
unsuccessfully argued that Congress had exceeded its constitutional 
authority and improperly invaded the province of the State in enacting 
 
The precise distinctions between the boundaries of Article III standing and Supreme Court original 
jurisdiction equitable standing nevertheless remain unclear. See, e.g., Woolhandler & Collins, supra 
note 29, at 490–91 (“Although the Court first articulated th[e] principle”—that a state cannot assert 
parens patriae standing to protect its citizens from the operation of an allegedly unconstitutional federal 
statute—“in an original jurisdiction suit, the principle bars state standing in the lower federal courts as 
well as in the Supreme Court.”). But the precise distinctions are not integral to my argument. As the text 
below shows, even taking the Court’s statements about standing as describing the Article III 
boundaries, the Court accepted standing where states relied on quasi-sovereign injuries allegedly caused 
by the federal government, see infra Section I.C.2.c, and that position is consistent with the argument I 
advance in favor of sovereign preemption state standing. Thus, my exposition simply takes the Court’s 
statements about standing at face value. 
 70 See supra Section I.C.1. 
 71 258 U.S. 158 (1922). 
 72 The Court explained: 
[T]his part of the bill does not present a case or controversy within the range of the judicial power 
as defined by the Constitution. It is only where rights, in themselves appropriate subjects of 
judicial cognizance, are being, or about to be, affected prejudicially by the application or 
enforcement of a statute that its validity may be called in question by a suitor and determined by 
an exertion of the judicial power. 
Id. at 162. 
 73 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
 74 The Court stated: 
[T]he complaint of the plaintiff State is brought to the naked contention that Congress has usurped 
the reserved powers of the several States by the mere enactment of the statute, though nothing has 
been done and nothing is to be done without their consent; and it is plain that that question, as it is 
thus presented, is political, and not judicial, in character, and therefore is not a matter which 
admits of the exercise of the judicial power. 
Id. at 483. 
 75 269 U.S. 328 (1926). 
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certain provisions of the Federal Water Power Act and applying them to 
waters within and bordering the State.76 
In short, the early twentieth century Court remained hostile to state 
suits against the federal government based on alleged injuries to the state’s 
sovereignty. 
b. Direct injury 
A direct injury is an injury that sovereigns and nonsovereigns can 
suffer alike. In the early twentieth century, the Court confronted settings 
where states alleged injury under a specific federal statute or injury 
resulting from agency action under some federal statute. The Court 
generally applied the same standing requirements that it would have 
applied in a case involving a plaintiff without sovereign status. Indeed, one 
can see glimpses of elements that would later become part of the modern 
tripartite standing test. Moreover, the Court did not uniformly deny the 
state’s ability to proceed, although it sometimes directed the state to seek 
relief in a lower federal court (or approved standing where the state had 
initiated proceedings in the lower federal court). 
The Court’s 1920 decision in Missouri v. Holland provides an early 
example.77 There, the State of Missouri filed suit in a lower federal court. 
Naming a federal game warden as defendant, the State sought to bar 
enforcement of a treaty between the U.S. and Great Britain governing 
migratory birds, as well as regulations promulgated by the Department of 
Agriculture pursuant to the treaty.78 In upholding the State’s standing, the 
Court noted that “[t]he State . . . alleges a pecuniary interest, as owner of 
the wild birds within its borders and otherwise, admitted by the 
Government to be sufficient . . . .”79 
Texas v. Interstate Commerce Commission provides another example. 
As noted above, Texas advanced an injury to its truly sovereign interests by 
virtue of the allegedly unconstitutional enactment of the Transportation Act 
 
 76 The Court explained: 
The defendants respond with a motion to dismiss, on the grounds, among others, that the bill does 
not present a case or controversy appropriate for the exertion of judicial power but only an 
abstract question respecting the relative authority of Congress and the State in dealing with such 
waters. If this be a proper characterization of the bill the motion to dismiss must prevail, as a 
reference to prior decisions will show. 
Id. at 330. And, indeed, the Court proceeded to survey earlier authorities—including Georgia v. 
Stanton, Texas v. Interstate Commerce Commission, and Massachusetts v. Mellon, where the Court had 
concluded that the questions raised were not justiciable. See id. at 330–34. 
 77 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
 78 Id. at 430–31. 
 79 Id. at 431. 
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of 1920.80 But Texas also challenged the validity of particular orders of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission under that Act.81 In response to that 
claim, the Court found that the State could seek relief but only by joining 
interstate carriers affected by the orders and filing “a suit in the District 
Court in which the United States is made a party.”82 
In its 1927 decision in Florida v. Mellon,83 the Court confronted 
Florida’s challenge to a federal inheritance tax law. Florida alleged “that 
the state is directly injured because the imposition of the federal tax, in the 
absence of a state tax which may be credited, will cause the withdrawal of 
property from the state with the consequent loss to the state of subjects of 
taxation.”84 The Court found this allegation insufficient to support the 
State’s right to pursue its suit since—using language that would decades 
later become a familiar part of the modern test for standing—the notion 
that people would withdraw property from the State as a result of the 
federal statute was “purely speculative, and, at most, only remote and 
indirect.”85 Thus, the Court’s decision emphasized—in terms common to 
current standing analysis—that the case before it did not present a 
sufficient injury. However, the Court did not preclude the possibility that a 
state could allege a valid direct injury against the federal government. 
In sum, the early-twentieth-century Court recognized that states could 
establish standing to sue the federal government based on an adequate 
direct injury. 
c. Injury to quasi-sovereign interests 
A state relies on a quasi-sovereign interest when it seeks to vindicate 
the well-being of its populace.86 As we shall see, courts of the era drew a 
distinction between cases where states relied on what we might call 
“competing parens patriae interests” on the one hand and cases where states 
relied on what we might call “true quasi-sovereign interests” on the other. 
Competing parens patriae interests are generic interests the state has in 
preserving its right to regulate in the face of allegedly illegal lawmaking by 
the federal government (or a federal government actor). The state simply 
 
 80 See supra text accompanying notes 71–72. 
 81 See Texas v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n & R.R. Labor Bd., 258 U.S. 158, 163–64 (1922). 
 82 Id. at 164; see North Dakota ex rel. Lemke v. Chicago, 257 U.S. 485, 491 (1922) (“There is no 
doubt that a State can sue in the District Court when the United States is a party and has consented to be 
sued there and has not expressed its consent to be sued elsewhere.”). 
 83 273 U.S. 12 (1927). 
 84 Id. at 16. 
 85 Id. at 18. 
 86 See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 602 (1982) (“Quasi-
sovereign interests . . . consist of a set of interests that the State has in the well-being of its populace.”). 
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asserts that its claim to legislate in its parens patriae capacity trumps the 
federal government’s competing parens patriae claim. The Court routinely 
rejected standing based on such allegations. 
In contrast, true quasi-sovereign interests are interests the state has in 
retaining jurisdiction to exercise its police power—perhaps especially, 
during this time period, over natural resources—within its borders in the 
face of federal government attempts to divest it of that jurisdiction. Thus, 
true quasi-sovereign interests differ from competing parens patriae interests 
in that a state asserting the former argues that the federal government has 
wrongly divested it of specific police power authority, leaving it unable to 
act within its borders to protect its citizenry. The Court in this era 
recognized standing based on allegations of infringement of a state’s true 
quasi-sovereign interests. 
Consider first cases of competing parens patriae interests. 
Massachusetts v. Mellon (discussed above in the context of the sovereign 
injury raised in the case) today represents the keystone in the line of 
precedent disapproving of injury to quasi-sovereign interests as a basis for 
state standing to sue the federal government.87 The Court in Massachusetts 
v. Mellon rejected the State’s assertion that it had parens patriae standing to 
challenge the federal Sheppard–Towner Act’s requirement that federal 
funding match state expenditures: 
We . . . consider whether the suit may be maintained by the State as the 
representative of its citizens. To this the answer is not doubtful. We need not 
go so far as to say that a State may never intervene by suit to protect its 
citizens against any form of enforcement of unconstitutional acts of Congress; 
but we are clear that the right to do so does not arise here. Ordinarily, at least, 
the only way in which a State may afford protection to its citizens in such 
cases is through the enforcement of its own criminal statutes, where that is 
appropriate, or by opening its courts to the injured persons for the 
maintenance of civil suits or actions. But the citizens of Massachusetts are 
also citizens of the United States. It cannot be conceded that a State, as parens 
patriae, may institute judicial proceedings to protect citizens of the United 
States from the operation of the statutes thereof. While the State, under some 
circumstances, may sue in that capacity for the protection of its citizens, it is 
no part of its duty or power to enforce their rights in respect of their relations 
with the Federal Government. In that field it is the United States, and not the 
State, which represents them as parens patriae, when such representation 
 
 87 See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 29, at 851 (“The fountainhead case in this field is the Supreme 
Court’s . . . decision in Massachusetts v. Mellon.”). 
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becomes appropriate; and to the former, and not to the latter, they must look 
for such protective measures as flow from that status.88 
Because the United States had a legitimate parens patriae interest, and 
such an interest displaces a state’s parens patriae interest, Massachusetts 
had no injury and, therefore, no standing to sue. 
In Florida v. Mellon (discussed above in the context of the direct 
injury raised by the State), the State argued that, by virtue of the 
introduction of the federal inheritance tax, “the citizens of the state are 
injured in such a way that the state may sue in their behalf as parens 
patriae.”89 The Court summarily dismissed this injury as a basis for suit, 
relying heavily on its earlier opinion in Massachusetts v. Mellon.90 
Contrast these cases raising “competing parens patriae” injuries, 
where the Court proved unwilling to find state standing, with cases raising 
“true quasi-sovereign” injuries, where the Court did recognize standing. In 
Missouri v. Holland (discussed above in the context of the direct injury 
raised), the State filed a claim challenging enforcement of the migratory 
bird treaty with Great Britain, as well as of a statute passed to give effect to 
the treaty and of Department of Agriculture regulations promulgated 
pursuant to the treaty.91 Missouri argued the federal actions would “invade 
the sovereign right of the State and contravene its will manifested in 
statutes.”92 Or, as the State put it, federal law “[invades] the sovereign right 
and power . . . to control and regulate the taking, killing and use of wild 
game within its borders.”93 After noting the government’s concession that 
the State’s direct injury (by virtue of its proprietary interest in wild birds 
within its borders) gave rise to standing,94 the Court stated: “[I]t is enough 
that the bill is a reasonable and proper means to assert the alleged quasi 
sovereign rights of a State.”95 While the Court’s opinion in this regard is 
not a model of clarity, it seems that the Court rested its conclusion on the 
State’s quasi-sovereign rights in the natural resource of migratory birds 
 
 88 262 U.S. 447, 485–86 (1923) (citation omitted). 
 89 273 U.S. at 16. 
 90 The entirety of the Court’s reasoning is as follows: Nor can the suit be maintained by the state 
because of any injury to its citizens. They are also citizens of the United States and subject to its laws. 
In respect of their relations with the federal government, “it is the United States, and not the State, 
which represents them as parens patriae, when such representation becomes appropriate; and to the 
former, and not to the latter, they must look for such protective measures as flow from that status.” Id. 
at 18 (quoting Mellon, 262 U.S. at 486). 
 91 252 U.S. 416, 431–32 (1920). 
 92 Id. at 431. 
 93 Motion to Advance at 3, Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (No. 609). 
 94 Missouri, 252 U.S. at 431; see also supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
 95 Missouri, 252 U.S. at 431. 
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within its borders,96 a point bolstered by the Court’s citation of several 
earlier cases affirming state standing to assert rights in regulating natural 
resources.97 
In a 1925 case, Colorado v. Toll,98 the State also asserted a true quasi-
sovereign interest. The case emerged in the wake of the creation of the 
Rocky Mountain National Park. The park included areas currently 
inhabited99 and had “roads . . . built by counties and the State . . . before the 
park was laid out.”100 Colorado alleged that it never had ceded sovereignty 
over the park.101 The dispute in Toll arose when the defendant—the park 
superintendent—asserted the authority (allegedly in violation of the 
governing federal statute) to ban anyone from residing permanently in the 
park and to preclude any for-hire automobiles on the roads within the park 
except those to which he had granted licenses.102 The Court explained that 
“[t]he object of the bill is to restrain an individual from doing acts that it is 
alleged that he has no authority to do and that derogate from the quasi-
sovereign authority of the State.”103 Citing Missouri v. Holland, the Court 
upheld jurisdiction, reversing the contrary judgment of the district court.104 
While once again the Court did not elucidate the nature of the quasi-
sovereign rights in question as clearly as it could have, it seems fairly clear 
 
 96 Professor Grove argues that Justice Holmes’s reference in Missouri v. Holland to “quasi 
sovereign rights” pertained more to preemption of state law than to the State’s right to protect and 
regulate its natural resources: 
Today, jurists and scholars often associate [quasi sovereign rights] with parens patriae standing, 
the authority of a State to bring suit on behalf of private citizens, largely because that is how the 
Supreme Court used the term in [Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 
458 U.S. 592, 602 (1982)]. But Justice Holmes was using the term “quasi-sovereign” in a very 
different sense—to refer to the State’s sovereign interest in the continued enforceability of state 
law. 
Grove, supra note 4, at 865 (citations omitted). But this argument ignores both the fact that the subject 
of regulation here was clearly a natural resource and that Justice Holmes’s opinion immediately after 
referring to “quasi sovereign rights” cited to other cases where a state had sought to vindicate its right to 
preserve and regulate its natural resources. See infra note 97; see also Massachusetts v. Mellon, 
262 U.S. 447, at 482 (1923) (describing the Court as having found standing in Missouri v. Holland 
“because, as asserted, there was an invasion, by acts done and threatened, of the quasi sovereign right of 
the state to regulate the taking of wild game within its borders”). 
 97 252 U.S. at 431 (citing Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 142 (1902); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper 
Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907); Marshall Dental Mfg. Co. v. Iowa, 226 U.S. 460, 462 (1913)). 
 98 268 U.S. 228 (1925). 
 99 See id. at 229 (“There are many thousands of acres in the park owned by private persons, and 
there are houses and hotels that were built before the park was laid out.”). 
 100 Id. at 230. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 229. 
 103 Id. at 230. 
 104 Id. 
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that the State complained of losing the power to regulate territory within its 
borders as to which it had never ceded sovereignty. 
Thus, in the early twentieth century, the Court recognized two bases 
for state standing to sue the federal government: direct injuries and an 
emerging concept of quasi-sovereign rights. 
3. The Modern Era 
In the modern era, the Supreme Court has developed and refined the 
generally applicable test for standing with which we are familiar today. But 
on a few occasions, the Court focused on, and recognized, the standing of 
states to challenge the action of the federal government. Most of these 
cases involve direct injuries to the states. However, the basis for the 
Court’s conclusion that standing existed in one case (perhaps the leading 
modern case)—Massachusetts v. EPA105—is less than clear. I canvass the 
direct-injury cases and then turn to the Court’s garbled holding in 
Massachusetts v. EPA. 
a. Direct-injury cases 
In a series of cases, the Court has recognized the standing of states 
based on constitutional injuries actually suffered by the states. While one 
might seek alternatively to categorize these injuries as sovereign in nature 
because the Constitution vests the underlying rights in the states as 
sovereigns, these injuries are better understood, as I discuss below, as 
direct injuries since the rights allegedly infringed belong to the states 
themselves.106 
In 1966, the Court decided South Carolina v. Katzenbach, upholding 
provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 against challenges by several 
States.107 The ground for the States’ challenges—that the provisions of the 
Act “exceed[ed] the powers of Congress and encroach[ed] on an area 
reserved to the States by the Constitution”108—sounds like one the Court 
would have dismissed as a nonjusticiable sovereign injury under the 
reasoning of Georgia v. Stanton and its progeny.109 But the Court proceeded 
to consider on the merits the States’ argument that Congress could not set 
voter qualifications in state and federal elections under the Fifteenth 
Amendment. While the Court did not make clear the basis for the States’ 
 
 105 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 106 See infra text accompanying notes 126–28. 
 107 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966). 
 108 Id. at 323. 
 109 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
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standing,110 commentators believe the States had standing to advance this 
claim because “the state sought to litigate its own liberty interest in setting 
voter qualifications, as provided by specific provisions of the Constitution 
that expressly contemplate state power to set such qualifications.”111 
Bolstering this conclusion is the fact that the Court did conclude that the 
States lacked standing in respect of other claims they tried to advance.112 
Four years later, in Oregon v. Mitchell, the Court considered the 
merits of arguments by four States against federal legislation requiring 
them to implement the eighteen-year-old voting age.113 The Court noted 
that “[n]o question has been raised concerning the standing of the parties or 
the jurisdiction of this Court,” and raised no question of its own.114 As in 
Katzenbach, “[t]he Court again based the state’s standing on explicit 
constitutional language contemplating general state control of election 
qualifications.”115 
South Carolina v. Regan, decided in 1984, involved a challenge by the 
State to a change to the federal tax law that retained the exemption from 
federal income taxation for interest earned on state-issued bonds, but only 
for certain types of bonds.116 The State argued that the tax law change 
violated the State’s rights under the Tenth Amendment.117 The Court 
accepted without discussion the standing of the plaintiff State. However, 
the Court’s reasoning, in the course of rejecting the applicability of the Tax 
Anti-Injunction Act (TAIA)118 to bar the State’s suit, confirms the fact that 
 
 110 See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324 (“[A] State [does not] have standing as the parent of its 
citizens to invoke these constitutional provisions against the Federal Government, the ultimate parens 
patriae of every American citizen. The objections to the Act which are raised under these provisions 
may therefore be considered only as additional aspects of the basic question presented by the case: Has 
Congress exercised its powers under the Fifteenth Amendment in an appropriate manner with relation 
to the States?” (citations omitted)). 
 111 Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 29, at 492. 
 112 The Katzenbach Court explained: 
The word “person” in the context of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment cannot . . . 
be expanded to encompass the States of the Union, and to our knowledge this has never been done 
by any court. Likewise, courts have consistently regarded the Bill of Attainder Clause of Article I 
and the principle of separation of powers only as protections for individual persons and private 
groups, those who are peculiarly vulnerable to non-judicial determinations of guilt. Nor does a 
State have standing as the parent of its citizens to invoke these constitutional provisions against 
the Federal Government, the ultimate parens patriae of every American citizen. 
383 U.S. at 323–24 (citations omitted). For further discussion, see Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 
29, at 492–93. 
 113 400 U.S. 112, 117 (1970). 
 114 Id. at 117 n.1. 
 115 Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 29, at 493. 
 116 465 U.S. 367, 371–72 (1984). 
 117 Id. at 370. 
 118 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2012). 
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the Constitution assigned the right at issue directly to the State. The federal 
government argued that, while the Court had interpreted the TAIA to be 
inapplicable where the would-be plaintiff had no alternative remedy, here 
the State did have an alternative remedy: It could rely on a lawsuit by a 
bondholder to challenge the change to the federal tax law.119 In rejecting 
this argument, the Court noted that “instances in which a third party may 
raise the constitutional rights of another are the exception rather than the 
rule.”120 This statement affirms that the constitutional rights at issue in the 
case belonged uniquely to the State. 
In two more cases after Regan (both of which commenced in federal 
district court121), the Court recognized state standing without addressing the 
issue. But in both cases, the constitutional rights advanced by the plaintiff 
States clearly belonged uniquely to the States. In South Dakota v. Dole, the 
Court upheld a federal provision that hinged state receipt of federal 
highway funds on the State’s agreement to set the minimum drinking age at 
twenty-one.122 South Dakota argued that the federal statute infringed rights 
accorded directly to it (the State) under the Twenty-First Amendment.123 
And, in New York v. United States,124 New York raised a challenge—resting 
on its rights under the Tenth Amendment and the Constitution’s Guarantee 
Clause125—to a federal law that required the State either to take title to 
radioactive waste or to regulate it on Congress’s terms. Again, in both 
cases it was clear that the rights the plaintiff States asserted belonged 
uniquely to the States themselves. 
While one might justifiably say that the States in these cases are 
raising sovereign injuries (in that the Constitution vests all the rights in 
question in state sovereigns) or quasi-sovereign injuries (in that the states 
 
 119 Regan, 465 U.S. at 380. 
 120 Id. 
 121 See supra note 69 (discussing the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction over suits brought by 
plaintiff states). 
 122 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987). 
 123 Id. at 205. Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment to the Constitution provides: “The 
transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or 
use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. XXI, § 2. The State pointed to Supreme Court precedent holding that “the ‘Twenty-first 
Amendment grants the States virtually complete control over whether to permit importation or sale of 
liquor and how to structure the liquor distribution system.’” Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987) (quoting 
Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980)). 
 124 505 U.S. 144, 149–54 (1992). 
 125 The Constitution’s Guarantee Clause provides: “The United States shall guarantee to every 
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; 
and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) 
against domestic Violence.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
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are really raising their arguments on behalf of their citizenry),126 it seems 
far more apt to say that the States here are raising direct injuries.127 While 
direct-injury cases in the nineteenth century extended typically to property 
and contract rights, in the cases just discussed, the State is suing to protect 
its own (now constitutional) rights, just as a private actor might sue to 
protect his or her own rights.128 
b. A Case that Defies Classification: Massachusetts v. EPA 
In the most recent case where the Court addressed, and upheld, state 
standing, the Court’s language leaves unclear the precise nature of the state 
injury that justified standing. In Massachusetts v. EPA,129 the Court 
reviewed the denial by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency of a 
petition requesting that the agency regulate greenhouse gas emissions from 
motor vehicles.130 Although numerous parties aligned against the EPA,131 
the Court rested its analysis of standing on the injury to the State of 
Massachusetts.132 
While the Court’s opinion clearly concludes that Massachusetts had 
standing, the majority opinion does not clearly identify the precise nature 
of the relevant injury. Instead the Court seems to vacillate between 
characterizing the State’s injury as quasi-sovereign and as direct. On the 
one hand, the Court recited the traditional test for standing133 and ultimately 
identified the injury as Massachusetts’s loss of coastline on its sovereign 
lands,134 a “garden-variety harm that would typically satisfy standing 
requirements.”135 In addition, the Court explained how the EPA did not 
 
 126 See Alexander M. Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 86–90 (criticizing 
the Court’s holding on standing in Katzenbach as inconsistent with its holding in Massachusetts v. 
Mellon); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 
1382 (1973) (“Since no pretense can be made that these cases involve ‘private’ rights, Professor Bickel 
is clearly correct in concluding that they stand in open contradiction to the Reconstruction cases and 
Massachusetts v. Mellon.”). 
 127 See Vladeck, supra note 29, at 857–65; Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 29, at 492–94. 
 128 See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 29, at 493. It is on this basis that Professor Vladeck 
argues that, while Professor Bickel correctly urged the retention of Massachusetts v. Mellon as good 
law on the ground that “preemption of a state’s law by the contested federal law cannot of itself provide 
the basis for state standing against the federal government,” the very same “thesis would suggest that, 
Bickel’s objections notwithstanding, the Supreme Court’s decision in [Katzenbach] was also correct.” 
Vladeck, supra note 29, at 849. 
 129 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 130 See id. at 510–16. 
 131 The original petition was filed by nineteen private organizations. Id. at 510 & n.15. 
 132 Id. at 518. The Court reasoned that “[o]nly one of the petitioners needs to have standing to 
permit us to consider the petition for review.” Id. 
 133 See id. at 517–18. 
 134 Id. at 519. 
 135 Nash, supra note 44, at 1294. 
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contest the harm caused by greenhouse gas emissions, thus allowing the 
Court to depict the harm as not merely conjectural136—again, a logical 
maneuver one might expect in a typical standing analysis. 
On the other hand, immediately after reciting the traditional test for 
standing, the Court asserted that “[i]t is of considerable relevance that the 
party seeking review here is a sovereign State and not . . . a private 
individual.”137 The Court then invoked its opinion in Georgia v. Tennessee 
Copper Co.,138 one of the quasi-sovereignty cases from the early twentieth 
century. There, the Court upheld Georgia’s standing—to sue a private 
actor, not the federal government—based on an assertion of Georgia’s 
quasi-sovereign interests in order to vindicate the health of its citizenry in 
the face of heavy pollution from beyond its borders.139 The Court then 
launched into a description of how Massachusetts’s inability to protect its 
citizens against climate change—by virtue of having “surrender[ed] 
sovereign prerogatives” to the federal government—gave rise to an injury 
where the federal government, though directed to address the problem, 
refused to act: 
When a State enters the Union, it surrenders certain sovereign prerogatives. 
Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode Island to force reductions in greenhouse 
gas emissions, it cannot negotiate an emissions treaty with China or India, and 
in some circumstances the exercise of its police powers to reduce in-state 
motor-vehicle emissions might well be pre-empted. 
These sovereign prerogatives are now lodged in the Federal Government, 
and Congress has ordered EPA to protect Massachusetts (among others) by 
prescribing standards applicable to the “emission of any air pollutant from any 
class or classes of new motor vehicle engines, which in [the Administrator’s] 
judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be 
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” Congress has moreover 
recognized a concomitant procedural right to challenge the rejection of its 
rulemaking petition as arbitrary and capricious. Given that procedural right 
and Massachusetts’ stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests, the 
Commonwealth is entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis.140 
Reconciling the Court’s divergent descriptions of the State’s injury 
presents no small challenge. While the Massachusetts Court said states are 
due “special solicitude” in the standing calculus, one is left to wonder what 
 
 136 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521. 
 137 Id. at 518. 
 138 Id. at 518–19 (citing Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)). 
 139 See Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237. 
 140 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519–20 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting 
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2012)). 
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role that solicitude plays if the crucial injury is the State’s loss of land. 
After all, loss of property is a typical economic injury, and the Court went 
to great lengths to establish that the parties agreed on the likelihood of the 
injury.141 Indeed, the Court asserted: 
[I]t is clear that petitioners’ submissions as they pertain to Massachusetts have 
satisfied the most demanding standards of the adversarial process. EPA’s 
steadfast refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions presents a risk of harm 
to Massachusetts that is both “actual” and “imminent.” There is, moreover, a 
“substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested” will prompt EPA to 
take steps to reduce that risk.142 
To be sure, the Court qualified the just-quoted statement by noting 
that it was saying this “with [special solicitude] in mind,” but it is hard to 
see how special solicitude pushed the case for standing over the edge if the 
submissions actually “satisfied the most demanding standards.”143 On the 
other hand, to the extent that the real injury was “Massachusetts’ stake in 
protecting its quasi-sovereign interests,”144 the Court’s emphasis on the loss 
of coastline is quite inapposite.145 
In sum, while Massachusetts clearly held that the State had standing, 
the Court’s basis for that conclusion remains muddled. Both the nature of 
 
 141 See Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 
2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 67 (noting that the case featured “an ordinary standing analysis that focused on 
Massachusetts qua large landowner rather than qua sovereign, which found that Massachusetts’s own 
coastal property was threatened by rising sea levels traceable to the effects of greenhouse gases,” and 
that that analysis was “distinct from the ‘special solicitude’ holding”); see also Bradford Mank, Should 
States Have Greater Standing Rights than Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA’s New Standing 
Test for States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1701, 1755 (2008) (“[W]ithout the relaxed immediacy and 
redressability standards of footnote seven or the special solicitude that the majority gave to states, the 
issue of whether Massachusetts met normal standing requirements is debatable.”). 
 142 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); 
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 79 (1978)). 
 143 Id. at 520–21; see also Mank, supra note 141, at 1707 (“The Court did not clearly explain 
whether Massachusetts could have met normal standing criteria or needed to rely on the special 
standing criteria for states.”). 
 144 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520. 
 145 The closest the Court came to drawing the two points together came when it stated: 
Just as Georgia’s independent interest “in all the earth and air within its domain” supported 
federal jurisdiction a century ago, so too does Massachusetts’ well-founded desire to preserve its 
sovereign territory today. That Massachusetts does in fact own a great deal of the “territory 
alleged to be affected” only reinforces the conclusion that its stake in the outcome of this case is 
sufficiently concrete to warrant the exercise of federal judicial power. 
Id. at 519 (citation omitted) (quoting Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)). There 
are problems with this reasoning: First, the Court’s parallel between the State’s “earth and air within its 
domain” and the State’s “sovereign territory” elides the historic distinction between quasi-sovereign 
and direct injuries. Second, to the extent that parens patriae is the key to the State’s ability to rely on 
land as the basis for standing, it is unclear how ownership of “a great deal” of that land “reinforces” the 
“concrete[ness]” of the injury. 
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the injury146 and the role of special solicitude147 have continued to befuddle 
commentators. 
D. Commentators’ Divergent Assessments 
The Court’s splintered jurisprudence has led commentators to come 
up with various different descriptive, and normative, assessments of when a 
state can, and should, have standing to sue the federal government. Writing 
over two decades ago (and before Massachusetts v. EPA), Professors 
Woolhandler and Collins acknowledged the emergence of cases in which 
the Court allowed states to sue federal government actors but remained 
wary of the practice. They explained that the “prohibition against state suits 
seeking to vindicate a claim to govern to the exclusion of other 
sovereigns . . . reinforced federalism interests as well as strengthened 
individual rights and the separation of powers.”148 And, in recent writing, 
Professor Woolhandler remains committed to this view.149 That said, she 
effectively concedes that the issue is not one of Article III standing, urging 
instead that “courts should decline to use their discretion to recognize such 
actions.”150 
 
 146 See, e.g., Calvin R. Massey, State Standing After Massachusetts v. EPA, 61 FLA. L. REV. 249, 
264–65 (2009) (“[T]he Court stated that Massachusetts was asserting ‘its rights under federal law,’ a 
locution that suggests that Massachusetts’ interest was either a proprietary interest or a sovereign 
interest.”) (quoting Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520 n.17)); Amy J. Wildermuth, Why State Standing in 
Massachusetts v. EPA Matters, 27 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 273, 315–17 (2007) (critiquing the 
Court’s treatment of injury in Massachusetts v. EPA). 
 147 See, e.g., Mank, supra note 141, at 1746 (“A major weakness in the Court’s opinion is that it 
never explained to what extent it had relaxed standing requirements for states. It provided little or no 
guidance to lower courts about the degree to which they should give ‘special solicitude’ to states in 
deciding standing issues.”); Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1, 67 (2011) (arguing that the “special solicitude” language “indicates the states should be 
accorded special access to federal court in order to challenge federal agency action”); see also Freeman 
& Vermeule, supra note 141, at 67–68 (asserting that “[i]t seems obvious” that Justice Stevens included 
the “special solicitude” language—as well as the language about procedural rights—“at least in 
part . . . [t]o garner [the] crucial fifth vote [of] Justice Kennedy”). 
 148 See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 29, at 438–39. 
 149 See Woolhandler, supra note 29, at 236. 
Existing remedies accommodate modern federalism; the judicial system traditionally sees private 
parties as having the paramount interest in contesting alleged governmental illegality; and the 
regulatory purposes of causes of action are served by traditional actions between government and 
individuals. In seeking recognition of sovereignty-based actions, moreover, the government-
plaintiff effectively asks the courts to extend the boundaries of both judicial and executive power, 
while undermining the role of individuals in challenging government illegality. 
Id. 
 150 Id. 
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Professor Vladeck seems more accepting of what I have termed the 
modern Court’s direct-injury state standing cases.151 At the same time, he, 
like Professors Woolhandler and Collins, is dubious about further 
extensions of state standing to sue the federal government.152 
Other commentators take a more expansive view of state standing to 
sue the federal government. Focusing on the holding in (if not the 
reasoning of) the Massachusetts case, they center on horizontal separation 
of powers as a basis for state standing to sue the federal government. 
Professor Gillian Metzger argues that, “given that Congress has disabled 
them from asserting regulatory authority in their own right, the states have 
a sovereign interest”—and therefore a basis for standing—“in ensuring that 
the federal government performs its regulatory responsibilities so that 
regulatory gaps are avoided.”153 Professor Bradford Mank asserts that a 
state “should be able to file parens patriae suits on behalf of its citizens 
against the federal government if the federal government has allegedly 
failed to perform a statutory or constitutional duty.”154 Professor Calvin 
Massey argues in favor of a broad conception of state standing to assert 
parens patriae claims against the federal government based upon Executive 
Branch violations of constitutional and federal statutory law.155 And 
Professor Amy Wildermuth can be understood to have argued that 
Massachusetts suggests that states may have standing to challenge the 
manner in which the federal government implements federal law, where 
that implementation results in the preemption of state law.156 
 
 151 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. I note that Professor Grove suggests that the States in 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach and Oregon v. Mitchell were really arguing that the federal government 
had improperly preempted state law governing voter qualifications. See Grove, supra note 4, at 871–72. 
 152 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 153 Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 2038 
(2008); see also id. at 2037–39. Professor Metzger acknowledges both that such reasoning is not 
ultimately consistent with the majority opinion in Massachusetts, see id. at 2038–39, and that it is in 
any event subject to numerous objections, see id. at 2039. 
 154 Mank, supra note 141, at 1771. 
 155 See Massey, supra note 146, at 276 (asserting that the argument against state standing to sue the 
federal government “ignores the fact that states . . . are appropriate custodians of public rights, and state 
assertion of public rights in federal court does no more than ensure that executive discretion is confined 
within the boundaries of the Constitution and federal law”); id. at 284 (“EPA is a salutary breach of the 
hitherto impenetrable Maginot Line of standing that prevented judicial consideration of executive 
lawlessness which inflicts universal but impersonal harm on the citizens of our nation.”). 
 156 Professor Grove characterizes Professor Wildermuth as having “argu[ed] that States may 
challenge not only federal preemption but also the manner in which a federal agency implements 
federal law.” Grove, supra note 4, at 887 n.181 (citing Wildermuth, supra note 146, at 318–21). I am 
not so sanguine that this accurately captures Professor Wildermuth’s argument. Professor Wildermuth 
argues that, had the Court in Massachusetts focused on the state of California instead of the state of 
Massachusetts, it would have easily found standing based on actual preemption of California law—i.e., 
a violation of its sovereign rights. Professor Wildermuth bases this conclusion on the fact that the Clean 
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Professor Tara Leigh Grove takes the view that preemption of state 
law alone provides a sufficient basis for state standing to sue the federal 
government.157 She also rejects the notion that horizontal separation of 
powers has a role to play in the state standing calculus.158 
Professor Shannon Roesler melds preemption of state law with the 
standing of states to challenge federal administrative programs. Professor 
Roesler argues that, “[b]ecause states cannot govern in many areas without 
confronting federal administrative law, they should be able to challenge 
federal laws and actions that are part of administrative regimes that 
contemplate an implementation role for the states.”159 With this background 
principle as the driver, she proposes that, “when states seek to challenge 
federal laws and actions, they have Article III standing if the federal law at 
issue contemplates a role for state governments in its implementation.”160 
Against this backdrop, I develop my description of sovereign 
preemption state standing to sue the federal government. I return to the 
 
Air Act assures California of the opportunity (with a waiver from the EPA) to promulgate its own 
standards for motor vehicle emissions standards (with other states free to elect between California’s 
standards and those promulgated by the EPA). Professor Wildermuth argues that, insofar as EPA 
declined to give California a waiver for standards for greenhouse gas emissions and that the EPA based 
this refusal to grant the waiver on the same reasoning it advanced in the Massachusetts case (i.e., that 
the EPA lacked the authority to regulate greenhouse gases at all), see Wildermuth, supra note 146 at 
318–19, the relief requested in Massachusetts (i.e., a declaration that the EPA indeed had the statutory 
authority to regulate greenhouse gases) would perforce determine the preemption of state law. Had the 
relief not been granted, then (since the EPA would lack power to regulate greenhouse gas emissions), 
no waiver would have been needed and state law would not have been preempted. On the other hand, 
had relief been granted, then the EPA would have had the power to deny the waiver and thus preempt 
state regulatory authority. See Wildermuth, supra note 146, at 318–20. Thus, the injury to California 
was, Professor Wildermuth argued, purely “a sovereign one.” Id. at 320. Seen in this light, Professor 
Wildermuth did not argue that federal implementation of federal law provides a basis for standing (or at 
least not generally, but only in the particular circumstances of the Clean Air Act under the facts of the 
Massachusetts case). But cf. Kathryn A. Watts & Amy J. Wildermuth, Massachusetts v. EPA: Breaking 
New Ground on Issues Other than Global Warming, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1029, 1034 (2008) (“We . . . 
think that when a state sues the federal government because federal law or administrative action 
regulates the state administrative machinery directly or otherwise undermines the state’s independence 
in the federal system—such as, for example, by potentially preempting state law—the state may bring 
suit without reference to the [traditional standing] analysis.”). 
 157 See Grove, supra note 4, at 880–85. 
 158 See id. at 885–99. 
 159 Roesler, supra note 33, at 677. 
 160 Id. at 678. Professor Roesler further elucidates: 
Federal funding conditioned on state assistance in implementing federal law is enough, as is 
conditional preemption of state authority in a given area. The implementation role need not be 
substantial, although states will not likely challenge laws that have small impacts (e.g., a law that 
requires very little regulatory change at the state level). The federal law must do more than grant  
states civil and criminal enforcement authority . . . it must contemplate that states will share in the 
day-to-day business of regulating by implementing federal policy through state administrative 
mechanisms and institutions. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
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views of other commentators—in the context of a discussion of the 
consistency of their views with sovereign preemption state standing—
below in Section II.B. 
II. DESCRIBING SOVEREIGN PREEMPTION STATE STANDING TO SUE THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
This Part introduces the concept of a state’s sovereign preemption 
standing to sue the federal government. Section A develops sovereign 
preemption state standing as a functional approach to state standing and 
describes its essential elements. Section B explains how the concept is 
broadly consistent with existing Supreme Court precedent. Finally, Section 
C turns to nuances and ways that sovereign preemption state standing 
might be broadly or narrowly construed. 
A. The Function of States and Sovereign Preemption State Standing 
Undoubtedly separation of powers concerns arise when a state sues 
the federal government. The Court’s penchant—when faced with 
competing parens patriae injuries—to reject jurisdiction on the ground that 
the conflict presents a political and not a judicial question, supports this 
assertion.161 A functional approach takes account of this concern by limiting 
standing to settings where a state seeks to vindicate a constitutionally 
preserved function.162 
1. The Constitutional Role of States 
The critical question in the separation of powers analysis becomes 
what constitutes a state’s function under the Constitution. There are some 
relatively easy cases; as I above (and other commentators) have argued, in 
cases where the Constitution affords a state a direct injury, the courts can 
readily apply the traditional tripartite test for standing—including the usual 
understanding of what an injury in fact requires—to determine whether 
standing for the state is appropriate. In such a case, the courts need not 
depart from the traditional approach to standing, even though a sovereign 
state happens to occupy the role of plaintiff. 
 
 161 See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text (describing Massachusetts v. Mellon, where the 
Court rejected the State’s argument that its interest in regulating as a parens patriae should trump the 
federal government’s analogous interest). 
 162 I have elsewhere propounded and defended a “functional” approach to defining the relevant 
injury other government entities—the Houses of Congress—can claim as a basis for standing. See Nash, 
supra note 36, at 368. There, I explained that a functional approach vindicates the constitutional design, 
while at the same time preserving the separation of powers concerns that undergird the importance of 
standing as a gatekeeper in this area. See id. 
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However, that is not the whole picture. The constitutional scheme 
assigns certain responsibilities to states and assumes that states retain 
certain responsibilities that predate the Constitution but that the 
Constitution preserves.163 Interference by the federal government in a 
state’s ability to fulfill these responsibilities imposes an “injury” on the 
state’s functional role within the constitutional structure and should also 
meet the “injury in fact” requirement. 
The notion that states should have a constitutionally protected 
function that can give rise to an injury should not be surprising. While the 
Constitution does not create the states (unlike the Houses of Congress), the 
Constitution clearly assumes their continued existence and incorporates 
states into the federal design.164 
A major role for the states under the constitutional design is to ensure 
the continued health and well-being of their citizens.165 The surest route the 
Constitution uses to protect the state’s ability to pursue this role is to 
preserve, in general, the state’s prerogative to exercise its police power.166 
This logic supports Professor Grove’s argument that states have standing to 
challenge the validity of federal government efforts to preempt state law.167 
While this argument is not (as I discuss below) inconsistent with sovereign 
preemption state standing,168 a state’s standing to challenge federal 
preemption does not equate to, nor does it subsume, sovereign preemption 
 
 163 See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838–39 (1995) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“The Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea that our citizens 
would have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the 
other. The resulting Constitution created a legal system unprecedented in form and design, establishing 
two orders of government, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual 
rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it. It is appropriate to recall these 
origins, which instruct us as to the nature of the two different governments created and confirmed by 
the Constitution.”). 
 164 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011) (“The allocation of powers in our 
federal system preserves the integrity, dignity, and residual sovereignty of the States. The federal 
balance is, in part, an end in itself, to ensure that States function as political entities in their own right.”; 
cf. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 724 (1999) (“[T]he Constitution was understood, in light of its 
history and structure, to preserve the States’ traditional immunity from private suits.”).  
 165 See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982) 
(surveying prior decisions to conclude that “a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-
being – both physical and economic – of its residents in general”). 
 166 See, e.g., supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's decision in Bond v. 
United States). Along similar lines, certain canons of construction applicable in federal court also 
recognize, and act to preserve, state legislative authority and core state functions. See, e.g., Medtronic, 
Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484–85 (1996) (describing the canon against preemption of state law); 
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 469–70 (1991) (describing the canon in favor of values of 
federalism). 
 167 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 168 See infra note 195 and accompanying text. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
232 
state standing. State standing to challenge the federal government’s action 
is not limited to settings where the state challenges the legality of the 
federal government’s effort at preemption; indeed, state standing may 
persist even after the courts have upheld the federal government’s 
preemption of state law. 
It is beyond cavil that the Constitution authorizes, and sometimes 
itself effects, the preemption of some state law. Upon entering the Union, 
the states delegated many powers to the federal government, including the 
power to preempt state law over additional areas of regulatory ambit.169 But 
this loss of power need not translate to a loss of function: Simply because a 
state lacks power directly to implement a regulatory response to a problem 
does not mean that it must abandon its function of trying to protect its 
citizenry from falling victim to that problem. An injury to the state’s ability 
to ensure the protection of its citizens inures to the detriment of the citizens 
themselves; it is, in other words, an injury that should give the state parens 
patriae standing. In such settings, the state may have standing to challenge 
the federal government’s decision to address a problem with one level (or 
type) of regulation (including no regulation) where the federal government 
has at the same time acted to preclude the state from exercising its own 
power to protect its citizens as it (the state) sees fit.170 
2. A Functional Approach 
The vertical separation of powers concerns described above may arise 
in many instances of preemption. That said, standing does not inhere in 
every instance of valid federal preemption of state law. Nor is it sufficient 
if the federal government in its stead chooses a level (or means) of 
protection different from that which the state, given its druthers, would 
have adopted. Indeed, two categories of settings leap to mind where this 
combination should not translate to a parens patriae injury. 
First, under the constitutional design, states completely surrender 
some of their prerogatives to the national government. Some powers thus 
become entirely off-limits to the states because the Constitution delegates 
them solely to the federal government. For example, the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the Commerce Clause to preempt certain state regulation 
 
 169 See infra text accompanying notes 171–73. 
 170 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007) (“When a State enters the Union, it 
surrenders certain sovereign prerogatives. Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode Island to force 
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, it cannot negotiate an emissions treaty with China or India, and 
in some circumstances the exercise of its police powers to reduce in-state motor-vehicle emissions 
might well be pre-empted.”). 
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automatically, without any action on the part of the national government.171 
As to such matters, the states have no function and, therefore, can suffer no 
injury172—even if the federal government implements no regulation in the 
wake of the preemption, thus leaving a regulatory void. 
Second, the Constitution has been interpreted to empower Congress to 
expropriate additional powers from the states beyond those already 
constitutionally assigned to the national government: For example, 
Congress has used the Commerce Clause as a basis for enacting federal 
environmental legislation that (to some degree at least) often preempts 
conflicting state law.173 In recognition of this fact, the Court historically 
declined to recognize a state’s injury where it simply alleged that federal 
legislation was not in the state’s interest or in the broad interest of its 
citizenry.174 As the Court routinely explained, the federal government fills 
the role of parens patriae as too do the states.175 The mere fact that two 
levels of government disagree about how (or sometimes even whether) to 
address a problem that affects some citizens does not mean that the state is 
not meeting its responsibility of protecting its citizens. After all, the duly 
elected representatives of the citizens in Washington and the duly elected 
representatives of the citizens in the state capital may have a different view 
of how to address a problem,176 and under the Constitution, the former will 
 
 171 See, e.g., Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980) (“Although the [Commerce] 
Clause . . . speaks in terms of powers bestowed upon Congress, the Court long has recognized that it 
also limits the power of the States to erect barriers against interstate trade.”). 
 172 Of course, a state government and the federal government may contest the proper boundary of 
the automatic preemption, in which case a state would have standing to argue that its state regulation 
falls beyond the ambit of the dormant Commerce Clause’s automatic preemption. See, e.g., Maine v. 
Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 132–37 (1986) (holding that the State had standing to appeal a judgment 
reversing a conviction under a federal law that incorporated state law on the grounds that state law was 
preempted by the Commerce Clause, even where the federal government—the original prosecutor—
sided with the criminal defendant and agreed not to pursue appeal). 
 173 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a) (2012) (Clean Air Act provision finding that air pollution often 
crosses state lines and has an impact on commercial values and activities); id. § 7543(a) (provision 
generally prohibiting states from imposing emissions-control requirements on new motor vehicles); see 
also Clean Air Mkts. Grp. v. Pataki, 338 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that certain state law 
provisions were impliedly preempted by the Clean Air Act). 
 174 See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text (discussing Massachusetts v. Mellon in this 
regard). 
 175 See supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing Massachusetts v. Mellon). 
 176 As I have explained elsewhere: 
[T]here may be a dispute between the federal and state governments as to the proper normative 
measure or approach [to the problem]. Perhaps the state government does not believe that cost-
benefit analysis should justify regulation, while the federal government does; or the state and 
federal governments agree on the validity of cost-benefit analysis, yet they disagree as to the 
assumptions underlying that analysis; or the state government takes a more precautionary 
approach than does the federal government. 
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trump the latter. Moreover, as Professor Herbert Wechsler pointed out, the 
states themselves enjoy de facto representation in the Houses of 
Congress.177 A similar story unfolds where the Executive Branch validly 
receives from Congress, and exercises, the power to preempt state law.178 
On the other hand, where the federal government has preempted state 
law and the Executive Branch modulates its administration of the laws 
enacted by Congress, the argument that the state has suffered an injury to 
its ability to protect its citizens is stronger (at least where the preemption 
prevents the state from acting on its own to remedy the situation). First, the 
claim that the federal government is clearly acting as the constitutionally 
authorized substitute parens patriae for the state is subject to doubt. To the 
extent that the Executive Branch has improperly substituted its choice of 
regulatory level for that of the Congress, there is an argument that the 
state’s citizenry writ large has suffered an injury.179 
 
Jonathan Remy Nash, Null Preemption, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1015, 1019 (2010). See generally id. 
at 1052–62. 
 177 See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the 
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 546–60 (1954); see 
also Nash, supra note 36, at 372. 
 178 Commentators are divided on whether agencies should have the power to preempt state law. 
Compare Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 695, 
708–25 (2008) (arguing that institutional competence and separation of powers weigh in favor of 
Congress making preemption choices, and so the standard presumption against preemption should apply 
with even greater force against agency preemption), Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional 
Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 766–69 (2008) (contending that courts should uphold agency 
preemption only where Congress has delegated such authority), Mark D. Rosen, Contextualizing 
Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 781, 796–800 (2008) (emphasizing, despite its shortcomings, 
Congress’s institutional advantages in making preemption decisions), Robert R.M. Verchick & Nina 
Mendelson, Preemption and Theories of Federalism, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND 
REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 13, 27 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009) (taking a skeptical 
view of agency preemption), Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 869, 871 
(2008) (advocating restricting the freedom of agencies to preempt unilaterally), with Brian Galle & 
Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge 
of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1990 (2008) (arguing that agencies may be better positioned than 
Congress to decide whether preemption of state law is appropriate), Metzger, supra note 153, at 2069–
72 (arguing that existing administrative law requirements may facilitate the inclusion of states’ interests 
in administrative decisions), Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional 
Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 477–502 (2008) (arguing in favor of agency reference of 
preemption decisions, with judicial review to ensure proper administrative process), and Catherine M. 
Sharkey, What Riegel Portends for FDA Preemption of State Law Products Liability Claims, 103 NW. 
U. L. REV. 437, 441–46 (2009) (making the same argument); see also William W. Buzbee, State 
Greenhouse Gas Regulation, Federal Climate Change Legislation, and the Preemption Sword, 1 SAN 
DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 23, 26 (2009) (arguing in favor of an independent “Preemption 
Review Committee” that would render preemption decisions in problematic settings based on statutory 
criteria and record evidence). 
 179 See Massey, supra note 146, at 263–64; Nash, supra note 176, at 1072–73. 
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Second, while the states enjoy some effective representation in the 
selection of the President, that representation pales in comparison to the 
state’s effective representation in and influence over Congress.180 Thus, to 
the extent that the Executive Branch has indeed chosen—without proper 
authority—to implement a statute at a level different from that chosen by 
Congress, one would have greater concern that the constitutional design 
may be frustrated. After all, if one of the justifications for the delegation of 
power—even some police power traditionally exercised by the states—to 
the federal government is that that power would be exercised by a federal 
actor subject to the influence of the states—i.e., the Legislative Branch—
the possibility that the Executive Branch is underexerting that appropriated 
power (at least as measured against Congress’s wishes) raises a concern. 
That standing arises out of the states’ constitutional function explains 
why states sometimes may have standing to challenge Executive Branch 
underenforcement while private actors may not. Like states, private actors 
may be frustrated by Executive Branch underenforcement. Unlike states, 
however, private actors have no justiciable stake in the constitutional 
separation of powers. Indeed, the Court’s assertion that states enjoy 
“special solicitude” in the standing calculus181 makes good sense when 
understood in this context. While the injury Executive Branch 
underenforcement inflicts on private actors is likely generalized and, 
therefore, insufficient to support standing, courts should afford “special 
solicitude” to states seeking to advance such claims by recognizing that 
Executive Branch underenforcement gives rise to an injury to a state’s 
quasi-sovereign interests. 
From a functional approach to state standing emerge the core elements 
for sovereign preemption state standing. First, the state must allege that the 
Executive Branch has underenforced the federal law in a way that is 
inconsistent with a governing statute. Second, the state must be able to 
point to preemption of state law. In particular, either the preemption of 
 
 180 See Massey, supra note 146, at 267 (“The method of electing Congress provides a ‘procedural 
safeguard’ for state polities that is wholly absent with respect to administrative agencies.”); Nash, supra 
note 36, at 372 (“Since the President is the only federal official elected nationwide—and indeed with a 
constituency that crosses any state boundary—the bulk of state political protection is provided by 
Congress (and perhaps especially by the Senate).”); Wechsler, supra note 177, at 558 (“It is in light of 
th[e] inherent tendency [of the government to preserve the domain of the states], reflected most 
importantly in Congress, that the governmental power distribution clauses of the Constitution gain their 
largest meaning as an instrument for the protection of the states. Those clauses, as is well known, have 
served far more to qualify or stop intrusive legislative measures in the Congress than to invalidate 
enacted legislation in the Supreme Court.”). 
 181 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007); see supra text accompanying notes 142–147. 
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state law must be obvious and clear from a federal statute;182 the federal 
government must have previously sought, or be concurrently seeking, to 
preempt state law; or the preemption must otherwise already have been 
determined judicially. I refer to this as a “preemption exhaustion” 
requirement; such a threshold requirement makes sense because the 
underenforcement of federal law would not injure the state and its citizens 
were state law not preempted.183 Finally, there must be a nexus between the 
area of preemption and the area in which the Executive Branch is allegedly 
underenforcing federal law. 
B. Consistency of Sovereign Preemption State Standing with Existing 
Standing Precedent and Doctrine 
How does sovereign preemption state standing square with existing 
standing doctrine and prior precedent? The answer is that it squares rather 
well. 
1. Consistency with Precedent 
Consider first the consistency of sovereign preemption state standing 
with existing precedent on state standing to sue the federal government. 
The value of sovereign preemption state standing is readily apparent when 
we reconsider Massachusetts v. EPA. Lurking in the background of the 
litigation were the facts that (1) the Clean Air Act empowers California to 
promulgate its own motor vehicle emissions standards with a waiver from 
EPA184 (which other states can then choose to follow in lieu of governing 
federal standards);185 (2) California had in fact requested a waiver from 
EPA to issue standards for motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions;186 and 
(3) the same logic that motivated EPA to argue in the Massachusetts 
litigation that it lacked statutory authority to regulate motor vehicle 
greenhouse gas emissions also convinced it to decline to act on California’s 
waiver request while the Massachusetts litigation was pending.187 In effect, 
 
 182 If the preemption is effected automatically by the Constitution, then the matter is something that 
the Constitution commits to the federal government, and the state can claim no injury in how the federal 
government (or the Executive Branch) decides to regulate in response to the matter. 
 183 Cf. Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Legislative Exhaustion, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1253, 1314–18 
(2017) (arguing in favor of Congress first exhausting its opportunity to resolve a conflict with the 
Executive Branch nonjudicially as a prerequisite for congressional standing). 
 184 See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2012). While not explicit, the wording of the statute authorizes only 
California to generate motor vehicle emissions standards. See Wildermuth, supra note 146, at 318. 
 185 See 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (2012); Wildermuth, supra note 146, at 318. 
 186 See Wildermuth, supra note 146, at 318–19. 
 187 See id. (“Although California applied for approval of its new standards in December 2005 the 
EPA would not consider California’s request because California’s regulation of greenhouse gas 
emissions was flatly inconsistent with the EPA’s reading of [the Clean Air Act] in the decision under 
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then, the Massachusetts case was litigated in the shadow of looming federal 
preemption of state police power (that Congress under the Clean Air Act 
had chosen to preserve). As language in the Court’s opinion reflects, the 
Court understood Massachusetts’s injury to result not from the preemption 
of state law but rather from the absence of regulation that would result from 
the combination of (a) preemption of the State’s prerogative to regulate, 
and (b) the assertion of the federal government that, even while it precluded 
State regulation, it too lacked the power to regulate.188 
Notably, while Professor Grove’s theory—that preemption of state 
law provides a sufficient injury for the standing calculus—is fine as far as it 
goes, it offers no justification for the Court’s conclusion in Massachusetts. 
After all, as Professor Grove herself points out in criticizing positions taken 
by Professor Metzger and by me, how could the injury be preemption of 
state law when, if the State obtained the relief it sought (in this case, 
obtaining a declaration that EPA could and should regulate motor vehicle 
greenhouse gas emissions), that injury would remain in place?189 Professor 
Grove’s criticism misconstrues what I believe to be the relevant injury: the 
harm to the citizens of the State resulting from the regulatory void.190 Once 
one defines the injury thus, it is apparent that obtaining the relief the State 
sought would indeed address that injury. 
 
review in Massachusetts.” (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 319 (“[I]t is striking that when the Court 
ruled in favor of a different interpretation of [the Clean Air Act than that advanced by the EPA] and 
remanded the issue to the EPA, the EPA immediately changed its position. Two days after the Court’s 
Massachusetts opinion was issued, the EPA announced that it would notice California’s request and 
schedule both a public comment period and public hearings as required [by statute].”). 
 188 The Court explained: 
 When a State enters the Union, it surrenders certain sovereign prerogatives. 
Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode Island to force reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, it 
cannot negotiate an emissions treaty with China or India, and in some circumstances the exercise 
of its police powers to reduce in-state motor-vehicle emissions might well be pre-empted. 
  These sovereign prerogatives are now lodged in the Federal Government, and Congress 
has ordered EPA to protect Massachusetts (among others) by prescribing standards applicable to 
the “emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicle engines, which 
in [the Administrator’s] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be 
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519–20 (2007) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting 
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2012)). 
 189 Professor Grove argues: 
[I]n Massachusetts v. EPA, the State’s sovereign injury—the inability to regulate—was caused 
not by the EPA’s inaction, but by the provision of the Clean Air Act that prohibits Massachusetts 
from regulating motor vehicle emissions. And the only way to redress the State’s sovereign injury 
was to lift the preemption—and thereby allow the State to “exercise . . . its police powers” to 
regulate motor vehicle emissions itself. The State would continue to suffer the injury identified by 
Professors Metzger and Nash—the inability to regulate—no matter what the EPA did (or failed to 
do). 
Grove, supra note 4, at 889 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519). 
 190 Instead, Professor Grove erroneously asserts that “the injury identified by Professor Metzger 
and Nash” was the State’s “inability to regulate.” Id. 
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Beyond settings like Massachusetts, how does sovereign preemption 
state standing interact with, and affect, other areas where the courts have 
recognized state standing to sue the federal government? Here, it is 
important to understand the limited scope of sovereign preemption state 
standing. The doctrine would have no impact on cases where states allege 
direct injury and thus readily coexists with Professor Vladeck’s acceptance 
of the holdings in those cases as relatively easy.191 The doctrine also in no 
way would change the result in any of the competing parens patriae cases 
above192: States still would not have standing in such cases.193 
Nor would the doctrine impede the conclusion that standing inheres in 
cases where the state alleges an injury simply due to the preemption of its 
sovereign police powers (whether the Legislative or Executive Branches 
effected the alleged preemption). Thus, the conclusions that the States had 
standing in Missouri v. Holland and Colorado v. Toll would stand.194 
Indeed, if Professor Grove is correct that the mere preemption of state law 
by the federal government should give rise to an injury sufficient to support 
standing,195 then the point of sovereign preemption state standing is to 
preserve the freedom of the state not only to seek to regain its lost police 
powers (by asserting preemption as its injury) but also to accept the 
preemption (or at least to accept an adjudication of the validity of the 
preemption) and to seek to force the federal government to live up to its 
obligation to regulate in its place. 
2. Consistency with Current Doctrine 
As discussed above, sovereign preemption state standing nicely 
complements Professor Grove’s argument in favor of state standing to 
challenge the validity of the preemption of state law. In some sense, the 
latter will often be the precursor to the former. A determination that the 
federal government has properly preempted state law may leave the state 
with a basis to sue if the Executive Branch underenforces the federal law 
that Congress enacted to fill the void left by the state law preemption. 
 
 191 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 192 See supra notes 86–90 and accompanying text. 
 193 In a competing parens patriae case, the State complains that the federal government’s regulatory 
response to a problem inadequately protects the State’s citizenry. Since there is no allegation in such a 
case that the federal Executive Branch is underenforcing federal law, there would be no sovereign 
preemption state standing. 
 194 See supra notes 91–104 and accompanying text. 
 195 I believe that Professor Grove is correct that mere preemption of state law is sufficient for 
standing, at least if the preempted state law goes to the state’s police power. I conclude that Professor 
Grove’s argument in the subsequent part of her Article relating to conflict over horizontal separation of 
powers is erroneous. 
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In contrast, sovereign preemption state standing is entirely 
inconsistent with Professor Grove’s argument that a state ought to have no 
standing to raise concerns of horizontal separation of powers.196 After all, 
sovereign preemption state standing is premised on the existence of 
Executive Branch underenforcement of federal statutory law. Professor 
Grove argues that the notion that a state could ever sue the federal 
government based on Executive Branch underenforcement “seems to rest 
on an assumption that States have a greater stake in the executive’s 
compliance with federal statutes than other members of society—private 
parties, localities, and even Congress.”197 But, as I explain below, sovereign 
preemption state standing does not require the states to have a greater stake 
in the executive’s compliance with federal statutes. Rather, it stems from 
the idea that, because other actors may not have standing to challenge 
Executive Branch noncompliance,198 the state ought to have the chance to 
use its parens patriae authority to protects its constituents. 
Beyond doctrinal analysis, Professor Grove tries to bolster her 
argument against state standing to challenge Executive Branch 
noncompliance by suggesting that the political aspirations of state attorneys 
general means that they “are not likely to be particularly savvy overseers of 
the federal executive’s implementation of federal law.”199 Professor Grove 
thus advances the argument that, to the extent that state attorneys general 
are today more likely to bring suits for political reasons,200 functionalist 
grounds suggest that the federal courts should be less welcoming to these 
suits. 
I find this argument unconvincing. First, as Professor Grove herself 
seems to concede, it seems odd to have the scope of standing enjoyed by a 
category of plaintiffs turn on the possible motivation of the plaintiffs’ 
counsel.201 The injury (if one exists), and the right to vindicate it, belong to 
the state. That should not—and, it seems, legally cannot—change simply 
because a state has (as states generally have) chosen to vest the authority to 
 
 196 See Grove, supra note 4, at 885–99. 
 197 Id. at 892 (footnote omitted). 
 198 See infra notes 218–220 and accompanying text. 
 199 Grove, supra note 4, at 897. 
 200 See Cornell W. Clayton, Law, Politics and the New Federalism: State Attorneys General as 
National Policymakers, 56 REV. POL. 525, 538 (1994). 
 201 Professor Grove herself notes that her argument to limit state standing based on horizontal 
separation of powers conflicts “relies primarily on constitutional principle and precedent.” Grove, supra 
note 4, at 895. That being the case, this portion of her argument—based as it is upon the presumed 
motivations of state lawyers filing suit—is an odd addition to Professor Grove’s principal argument. 
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bring suit in the person of an elected official.202 To put the point another 
way, whether a plaintiff has standing or not ought not to turn on the 
motivations (or speculation about the motivations) of the attorney bringing 
the suit.203 Second, to the extent that political aspirations may motivate state 
attorneys general to bring frivolous suits, they face sanctions for doing so 
(as do all attorneys who bring frivolous suits).204 Third, even if the 
argument might otherwise have weight, the factual predicate is far from 
clear; Professor Massey has argued to the contrary that the offices of state 
attorneys general actually “have limited resources and are politically 
constrained,”205 and as such will likely focus on “[o]nly particularly 
egregious executive violations of public rights.”206 Finally, to whatever 
extent Professor Grove’s concerns about state attorneys general prove true, 
sovereign preemption standing is narrow enough to allay concerns over the 
efforts of state attorneys general to rely on it more often than they should. 
Finally, sovereign preemption state standing is not technically 
inconsistent with Professor Roesler’s argument in favor of state standing to 
sue the federal government over a jointly administered federal program.207 
On the other hand, my approach and Professor Roesler’s rest on very 
different premises: On Professor Roesler’s account, standing arises out of 
joint administration of regulatory programs by the state and federal 
governments.208 On my account, standing arises from a lack of agreement 
between the federal Executive and Legislative Branches, which runs to the 
detriment of the states’ ability to protect their citizens. Moreover, if states 
could make use of both approaches, they could conceivably challenge a 
sizeable number of federal actions. Given the largely unrelated logical 
 
 202 Professor Grove does not explain why these same elected officials are better situated to assess 
when to bring actions challenging the preemption of state law (or, alternatively, why this concern does 
not figure into standing to challenge preemption). 
 203 It would similarly be odd to deny standing in class action cases because of a perception that 
counsel in those cases had ulterior motives for choosing to represent classes in those cases.  
 204 That the injury, and the claim associated with it, belong to the plaintiff state does not preclude 
the attorney representing the state from facing sanctions for bringing a frivolous claim. Provisions 
authorizing sanctions against attorneys contain no exception for state attorneys general. See, e.g., 
28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012) (authorizing sanctions against “[a]ny attorney or other person admitted to 
conduct cases in any court of the United States”); FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c) (authorizing sanctions against 
“any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule”); Husain v. Springer, No. 97 CV 
2982(NG)(CLP), 2005 WL 1502897, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 2005) (imposing nominal monetary 
sanctions against the Office of the New York State Attorney General under § 1927); Enriquez v. 
Estelle, 837 F. Supp. 830, 834 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (imposing monetary sanctions against the Attorney 
General of Texas). 
 205 Massey, supra note 146, at 274. 
 206 Id. at 279. 
 207 See supra text accompanying notes 159–60. 
 208 See id. 
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underpinnings of the two arguments, it is not surprising that, as my 
discussion of particular cases below reveals, the classes of cases where 
states would have standing to sue the federal government under his 
conception of state standing and mine do not substantially overlap.209 
Overall, sovereign preemption state standing squares nicely with 
existing precedent, as well as with current notions of state standing to sue 
the federal government. 
3. Consistency with Standing Doctrine’s Function 
Does sovereign preemption state standing also square with the 
function of standing doctrine generally? The answer again is affirmative. 
One purpose of standing is simply to limit the number of cases that 
reach the federal courts.210 Of course, if one disagrees with my argument 
above that sovereign preemption state standing is consistent with existing 
Court precedent, then one likely believes that the doctrine will expand the 
universe of cases that currently can be heard in federal court. Even then the 
number of additional cases will likely remain small. The requirements for 
sovereign preemption state standing are exacting. Moreover, the courts can 
apply the doctrine in a way that limits its availability only to settings 
where—as Professor Woolhandler suggests—Congress has explicitly 
authorized the plaintiff state’s case by generating a statutory cause of 
action.211 
Nor does the implementation of sovereign preemption state standing 
frustrate Professor Maxwell Stearns’s argument that standing doctrine 
serves to discourage attempts by litigants to manipulate courts’ dockets.212 
 
 209 I argue below that sovereign preemption state standing would be available in United States v. 
Texas but not in Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, see infra Sections II.D.1–2, while Professor 
Roesler argued that the state should have standing in Virginia but not Texas, see Roesler, supra note 33, 
at 695–702. 
 210 See, e.g., F. Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 89 (2012) (noting 
that an “objection to expanding standing . . . is that it would open the floodgates of litigation and 
overburden the federal dockets”). 
 211 See Woolhandler, supra note 29, at 212. Such a cause of action might currently be authorized 
by the Constitution or by the Administrative Procedure Act. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012) (granting a 
right to judicial review to a person affected by agency action). But see Armstrong v. Exceptional Child 
Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1383–84 (2015) (holding that the Supremacy Clause does not give rise to a 
private right of action); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828–35 (1985) (holding that the 
Administrative Procedure Act provides no private right of action to challenge an agency’s exercise of 
its discretion not to act). 
 212 See Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 
83 CALIF. L. REV. 1309, 1323 (1995) (noting that standing is a “device used by federal courts to fend 
off challenges to governmental conduct that are brought primarily on an ideological basis”); see also 
Kenneth E. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court—A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645, 672–
73, 683–85 (1973) (arguing that standing serves the purpose of rationing scarce judicial resources and 
defining the courts’ policymaking role). See generally Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: 
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Once again, the requirements of the doctrine are too demanding to allow 
litigants—here, states—to bring suits in the hopes of manipulating the 
federal courts’ dockets. 
And, to the extent that one believes that a goal of standing doctrine is 
to validate the separation of powers among the branches of government,213 
sovereign preemption state standing does not undermine that goal. 
Sovereign preemption state standing requires a true parens patriae injury to 
the state. The adversity between the parties is real, and the dispute does 
indeed resemble a case that might traditionally come before a court.214 
C. Nuances 
This Section discusses nuances that attend the recognition of 
sovereign preemption state standing. It first discusses the proper level of 
stringency for sovereign preemption state standing’s nexus requirement. 
Second, it addresses how, and whether, sovereign preemption state 
standing might extend to cases of Executive Branch overenforcement (as 
opposed to Executive Branch underenforcement) of federal law. Third, the 
Section highlights that sovereign preemption state standing speaks to the 
outer boundaries of Article III standing and, thus, leaves Congress free not 
to provide standing under statutory causes of action it enacts. Finally, it 
discusses the interplay between sovereign preemption state standing and 
the bar against standing for generalized grievances. 
1. The Stringency of Sovereign Preemption State Standing’s Nexus 
Requirement 
Sovereign preemption state standing requires a nexus between the area 
in which the federal government has preempted or is seeking to preempt 
state law and the area of law in which the Executive Branch is allegedly 
underenforcing federal law. But how close a nexus is required? If the areas 
of law must be identical, then sovereign preemption state standing will be 
rather narrow. Given the functional basis for sovereign preemption state 
standing, it makes more sense to look for substantial overlap between the 
goal of the law that the Executive Branch is allegedly underenforcing and 
 
Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 309 (1995) (drawing on historical evidence and case law to 
support point that standing doctrines prevent manipulation). 
 213 But see Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 474–75, 483–92, 
497–500 (2008) (critiquing the notion that standing doctrine in fact can and should serve to validate 
separation of powers goals). 
 214 See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (“[T]he business of federal courts [is limited] 
to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution 
through the judicial process.”). To the extent that separation of powers concerns are seen to preclude, or 
at least guard against, the assertion of generalized grievances, I argue below that sovereign preemption 
state standing does not run afoul of this notion. See infra Section II.C.4. 
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the goal of the preempted state law. To be sure, any such analysis is bound 
to be somewhat subjective. Still, the success courts have had with similar 
inquiries—consider the definition of the relevant “field” of law in deciding 
whether Congress has effected “field preemption”215—suggests that the 
courts would be well positioned to undertake such an analysis in this 
setting. 
2. Should Sovereign Preemption State Standing Extend to Cases of 
Executive Overenforcement of Federal Law? 
As I have described sovereign preemption state standing to this point, 
it permits a state to allege that the Executive Branch has underenforced 
existing federal statutory law. But should such standing also apply where 
the state alleges an overenforcement of federal law by the Executive 
Branch, i.e., wherever the state can allege a difference between Congress’s 
enforcement expectations (as expressed in the governing statute) and the 
Executive Branch’s enforcement practices? Indeed, one might criticize the 
narrower version of sovereign preemption state standing as biased in favor 
of obtaining increasing levels of regulation. 
While it would not be inconceivable to have a broader conception of 
sovereign preemption state standing that embraces alleged Executive 
Branch overenforcement of federal law, there are justifications for adhering 
to the narrower conception. First, the functional justification for sovereign 
preemption state standing is to ensure that the state’s police power does not 
go underutilized, even when expropriated by the federal government. But 
the essence of the police power consists of the power affirmatively to 
regulate, not the power to abstain from regulation.216 It thus ought not to be 
surprising that a valid conception of sovereign preemption state standing 
might be biased in favor of generating more regulation. 
Second, concerns of democratic accountability give rise to a related 
justification for restricting sovereign preemption state standing to cases of 
alleged Executive Branch underenforcement. To the extent that a problem 
facing the state falls within the scope of problems ordinarily dealt with by 
 
 215 See, e.g., S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. 
REV. 685, 744–47 (1991) (discussing how courts are equipped—in cases where field preemption is at 
issue—to deal with arguments by parties, and ambiguity over what the relevant field of law is). 
Consider as well the analysis courts undertake in an antitrust case to determine the “relevant market.” 
See generally Gregory J. Werden, The History of Antitrust Market Delineation, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 123 
(1992). The nexus inquiry I set out here would also invite courts to engage in a form of purposivism, 
despite the drift of judges in recent decades away from purposivism and toward textualism. Still, that 
some purposivist analysis might be involved is not surprising given the role of preemption in the 
sovereign preemption state standing analysis. See generally Note, Preemption as Purposivism’s Last 
Refuge, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1056 (2013). 
 216 See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
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the state government, the citizens of a state reasonably might not 
understand that the state government was disempowered from acting217 or 
that the Executive Branch was responsible for underenforcing the federal 
legislature’s directive. On the other hand, it is harder to see how the 
citizens of a state might blame state government for the Executive Branch’s 
overenforcement of federal law. 
A third and final justification, is the general point (perhaps prudential) 
that it is less important to stretch standing doctrine to recognize a plaintiff’s 
standing where another plaintiff has clear standing.218 The Court has made 
this point in particular in the context of would-be governmental plaintiffs, 
noting the reduced need to find standing for such plaintiffs where a “private 
plaintiff” likely has standing to raise the same issue.219 Settings of alleged 
overregulation will more likely generate private plaintiffs directly affected 
by the allegedly overregulatory behavior220 than will settings of 
underregulatory behavior. For that reason, states need less opportunity to 
challenge Executive Branch overenforcement. By contrast, the likely 
absence of a private plaintiff in cases of alleged Executive Branch 
underenforcement supports state standing. 
3. Sovereign Preemption State Standing Meets the Article III 
Standard but Does Not Speak to Statutory Standing 
The functional considerations on which sovereign preemption state 
standing rests relate to Article III standing. The fact that a state has 
sovereign preemption standing says nothing about whether the state has 
valid standing under a congressional statute (any more than the fact that a 
statutory grant of state standing would negate the Article III standing 
 
 217 Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992) (“Accountability is thus diminished 
when, due to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views of the 
local electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal regulation.”). 
 218 See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 614 (2007) (plurality 
opinion) (“[R]espondents make no effort to show that these improbable abuses could not be challenged 
in federal court by plaintiffs who would possess standing based on grounds other than taxpayer 
standing.”). 
 219 See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829–30 (1997) (noting that holding that members of 
Congress lacked standing did not “foreclose[] the Act from constitutional challenge (by someone who 
suffers judicially cognizable injury as a result of the Act),” while also observing that the Court “need 
not now decide” whether the outcome would have been different were a private plaintiff unavailable or 
unable to proceed); cf. South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 380–81 (1984) (holding that the Anti-
Injunction Act should not apply to preclude state suit, reasoning that even though in theory a private 
plaintiff still could bring suit and raise the same question, “it is by no means certain that the State would 
be able to convince a [private party] to raise its claims”). 
 220 See infra text accompanying note 263. 
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requirement221). I note that my conception of sovereign preemption state 
standing is consistent with the notion, advanced by Professor 
Woolhandler,222 that federal courts should decline to exercise jurisdiction to 
hear a state’s claim unless a statute authorizes the federal courts to hear the 
claim.223 
4. The Interplay Between Sovereign Preemption State Standing and 
the Bar Against Standing for Generalized Grievances 
The Supreme Court has explained that a party generally has standing 
only for “particularized grievances,” and not for generalized grievances 
that are shared by too many citizens.224 One could take the position that the 
bar against generalized grievances applies as well in the context of 
sovereign preemption state standing. 
Scholars debate whether the bar against standing for generalized 
grievances is constitutional or merely prudential.225 To the extent it is 
merely prudential, it does not pose an insurmountable obstacle to sovereign 
preemption state standing. Indeed, one might interpret the Massachusetts 
Court’s invocation of the “special solicitude” of the states in the standing 
calculus as a suggestion that the generalized grievance prudential 
restriction should not apply in cases of state standing226 (or at least in cases 
of sovereign preemption state sanding). 
On the other hand, even if the “particularized grievance” requirement 
does apply in sovereign preemption state standing cases (whether because 
the requirement is constitutional, or because, though prudential, courts 
should generally apply the doctrine even to assertions of standing by 
 
 221 To put this another way, Congress cannot grant standing beyond that which Article III 
authorizes. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“The Court’s holding that there is an outer limit to the power of Congress to confer rights of action is a 
direct and necessary consequence of the case and controversy limitations found in Article III.”). 
 222 See supra note 211 and accompanying text. 
 223 Other subconstitutional standing doctrines are similarly consistent with sovereign preemption 
state standing. See Massey, supra note 146, at 279 (arguing that the political question doctrine can be 
applied in cases where states rely on parens patriae standing); infra text accompanying note 225 
(discussing the possibility that the “bar” against standing for generalized grievances is 
subconstitutional). 
 224 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755–56 (1984) (rejecting an “abstract stigmatic 
injury . . . [that] would extend nationwide to all members of the particular racial groups against which 
the Government was alleged to be discriminating”). 
 225 For discussion, see e.g., Nash, supra note 44, at 1305 & n.132. For a discussion of how the 
Court has variously treated the requirement as constitutional and prudential, see Craig A. Stern, Another 
Sign from Hein: Does the Generalized Grievance Fail a Constitutional or Prudential Test of Federal 
Standing to Sue?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1169, 1204–17 (2008). 
 226 See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Prudential Standing Doctrine Abolished or Waiting for a 
Comeback?: Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 213, 238 
(2015) (making such a suggestion). 
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states), and even if the “particularized grievance” requirement acts to 
preclude many cases where sovereign preemption state standing would 
otherwise apply, the doctrine still would have significant purchase. This is 
because there remain cases where some states actually have particularized 
claims, i.e., have parens patriae claims that other states do not. 
Indeed, the two cases I discussed in the Introduction provide examples 
of settings where sovereign preemption state standing might apply227 and 
where some state plaintiffs would have particularized claims. Consider first 
the setting of global warming as exemplified in Massachusetts v. EPA. 
Leaving to the side the fact that the Court there seemed to rely on 
Massachusetts’ actual ownership of coastline that would disappear with 
rising sea levels resulting from global warming, the fact remains that 
coastal states face far more of a risk from global warming than inland 
states.228 Indeed, some states in the plains may actually benefit from some 
degree of global warming.229 In short, Louisiana and Florida could have 
alleged particularized injuries as a result of EPA’s failure to regulate 
greenhouse gas tailpipe emissions.230 
United States v. Texas addresses allegations by numerous states that 
the Executive Branch improperly underenforced the immigration laws. And 
in the context of illegal immigration, the Supreme Court has previously 
recognized that some states bear greater harm than others.231 These states 
presumably could satisfy the particularized grievance requirement. 
D. Applying Sovereign Preemption State Standing 
How might sovereign preemption state standing apply in disputes 
recently and currently before the courts? This Part explores how sovereign 
preemption state standing would apply, or not apply, in actual cases (and in 
 
 227 See supra notes 7–22 and accompanying text. 
 228 See, e.g., Susan Muller, Unprecedented Harm: Will the Roberts Court Recognize the Distinction 
Between Global Warming and Its Effects?, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 317, 338 (2010) (“A perhaps more 
obvious feature of sea level rise is that it has no impact on people living away from coasts, while people 
living on coasts and owners of coastal property are affected in a very concrete and personal way . . . .”). 
 229 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 1, 33 (2007) (“On some estimates, American agriculture will actually be a net winner as a result 
of climate change.”). 
 230 See also supra note 156 (discussing Professor Wildermuth’s argument that California was in a 
unique position to sue the EPA for its failure to regulate tailpipe greenhouse gas emissions, given the 
special status that California enjoys under the Clean Air Act to promulgate motor vehicle emissions 
standards). 
 231 See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976) (noting that “local problems” associated with 
the employment of illegal immigrants “are particularly acute in California in light of the significant 
influx into that State of illegal aliens from neighboring Mexico.”). 
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one hypothetical case based on an actual case) recently brought before the 
federal courts. 
1. State Standing in United States v. Texas 
Consider first United States v. Texas.232 As noted above, the Court 
affirmed, by tie vote, the existence of Texas’s standing to challenge the 
alleged underenforcement of the federal immigration laws by the Obama 
Administration.233 As also noted above, Texas did what it could to define its 
injury in terms of the existing pigeonholes of direct injury to the State—
there, the cost of issuing more driver’s licenses—and of injury to a truly 
sovereign interest, the issuance of driver’s licenses.234 
Sovereign preemption state standing provides a better fit. The 
regulation of immigration is a core police power that the states have largely 
ceded to the federal government. Indeed, the federal government recently 
relied on the federal courts to validate a strong understanding of the 
preemption of state powers in the area. In 2010, Arizona enacted the 
Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (the Arizona 
law) with the express goal of “discourag[ing] and deter[ring] the unlawful 
entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully 
present in the United States.”235 The Obama Administration opposed the 
Arizona law from its enactment236 and promptly filed suit against the State 
to enjoin the law’s implementation.237 
The litigation ultimately reached the U.S. Supreme Court, which 
largely accepted the federal government’s argument that federal law 
preempted the Arizona law.238 The Court held that federal law preempted 
Arizona law provisions that (1) made it a misdemeanor under state law to 
fail to comply with federal alien-registration requirements,239 (2) made it a 
misdemeanor under state law for an alien without authority to be in the 
United States to seek, or engage in, work in Arizona,240 and (3) authorized a 
 
 232 Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 
2015), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
 233 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 234 See supra text accompanying notes 16–17. 
 235 See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497 (2012) (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 11-1051 editor’s note (2012)). 
 236 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Advocates of an Immigration Overhaul Question a Border 
Deployment, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2010, at A22 (“Mr. Obama . . . condemned [the Arizona Law] on the 
day it was signed into law.”). 
 237 See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 
2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
 238 See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501–10. 
 239 See id. at 2501–03 (discussing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1509 (2011)). 
 240 See id. at 2503–05 (discussing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2928(C) (2011)). 
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police officer in the state to arrest without a warrant a person whom “the 
officer has probable cause to believe . . . has committed any public offense 
that makes the person removable from the United States.”241 
Given the preemption backdrop, the subsequent lawsuit by Texas 
sought to protect the citizens of the states from the regulatory gap that 
would, Texas argued, result from the underenforcement of the law by the 
federal government. The only question possibly hindering the applicability 
of sovereign preemption state standing is whether a sufficient nexus existed 
between the federal government’s preemption of state law, on the one hand, 
and the area of alleged underenforcement of federal law on the other. One 
might argue that the Arizona criminal law and law enforcement provisions 
that the Supreme Court invalidated differed in kind from the immigration-
status laws that the Executive Branch had allegedly underenforced through 
its issuance of DAPA. It seems, however, that a strong argument can be 
made that the Arizona case vindicated the Executive Branch’s desire to 
minimize the states’ role in immigration enforcement, while the issuance of 
DAPA allegedly reflected the underenforcement of federal immigration 
law.242 If so, then sovereign preemption state standing would apply. 
2. State Standing in Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius 
Consider next the case of Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius,243 
where the State of Virginia, acting through its Attorney General, sought to 
challenge the federal Affordable Care Act (ACA) on the ground that the 
ACA’s “individual mandate”—which requires individuals to purchase 
health insurance coverage or pay a penalty244—was an unconstitutional 
exercise of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. As its injury, 
Virginia pointed to the preemption of a provision of its law—enacted 
contemporaneously with the ACA—that provided that “[n]o resident of this 
Commonwealth . . . shall be required to obtain or maintain a policy of 
individual insurance coverage.”245 Here, sovereign preemption state 
 
 241 Id. at 2498 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3883(A)(5) (2011)); see id. at 2505–07 
(discussing that provision of the Arizona law). The Court also expressed suspicion over the viability of 
a fourth provision, see id. at 2509–10, one that provided that “officers who conduct a stop, detention, or 
arrest must in some circumstances make efforts to verify the person’s immigration status with the 
Federal Government,” id. at 2498 (discussing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2012)). The Court 
did not, however, declare that provision completely preempted. See id. at 2507–10 (discussing ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2012)). 
 242 To the extent that the bar against generalized grievances is applicable in sovereign preemption 
state standing cases, the grievance in United States v. Texas is likely sufficiently particularized. See 
supra text accompanying note 231. 
 243 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 244 See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a)-(b) (2012). 
 245 VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3430.1:1 (2017). 
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preemption would not provide a basis for standing (and thus would not 
change the result in the case246). Virginia did not meet either prong of the 
doctrine. First, no issue of horizontal separation of powers existed: Virginia 
challenged Congress’s ability to enact the ACA’s individual mandate in the 
first place. In that sense, the alleged injury was really a “competing parens 
patriae” assertion, which remains ineffective to establish standing.247 
Indeed, Virginia made no allegation in the case that the Executive Branch 
was underenforcing federal law. 
Second, even if Virginia had somehow raised a horizontal separation 
of powers issue, the Commonwealth had not met the preemption 
exhaustion requirement: the governing federal statute did not clearly and 
obviously preempt Virginia law, and neither the State nor the federal 
government took affirmative steps to determine whether Virginia law was 
actually preempted.248 In order for the possibility of a regulatory gap to be 
imminent and nonconjectural, sovereign preemption state standing requires 
that the preemption of state law be real and not just hypothetically 
predicted. Here such imminence simply did not exist. 
3. Oregon’s Claim in the Gonzales v. Oregon Litigation 
Third, consider the dispute in Gonzales v. Oregon249 over Oregon’s 
Death with Dignity Act (ODWDA).250 In order to achieve the statutory goal 
of authorizing physician-assisted suicide and insulating physicians who 
assisted in suicides, the ODWDA “exempts from civil or criminal liability 
state-licensed physicians who, in compliance with the specific safeguards 
in ODWDA, dispense or prescribe a lethal dose of drugs upon the request 
of a terminally ill patient.”251 This, however, led to a possible conflict with 
federal law, since the federal Controlled Substance Act (CSA) regulated the 
drugs that physicians prescribed under the ODWDA.252 The CSA groups 
 
 246 In the actual litigation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that 
Virginia did not have standing to proceed. 656 F.3d at 269–73. 
 247 In effect, the Virginia case is the flip of what I call “null preemption.” Null preemption arises 
when the federal government preempts state law and, by enacting nothing to fill the resulting gap, 
leaves in its wake a regulatory void. See Nash, supra note 176, at 1039–47. Here, by contrast, it is the 
State that prefers a regulatory void, while the federal government believes that regulation is the answer. 
The simple constitutional answer is that, per the Supremacy Clause, Congress wins the battle between 
the sovereigns. 
 248 On the question of whether the state had standing simply to challenge the preemption of state 
law, Professor Grove explains, along somewhat similar lines, “I argue . . . that to the extent a state law 
merely declares that private citizens are not subject to legal requirements, and does not seek to regulate 
private citizens, that is not sufficient for standing purposes.” Grove, supra note 4, at 877. 
 249 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
 250 See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800–897 (2015); Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 249. 
 251 Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 249. 
 252 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904 (2012). 
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drugs into categories, or “schedules”; the schedule on which the drugs in 
question appears renders that drug dispensable by a physician only directly 
or by way of a prescription.253 The CSA authorizes the Attorney General by 
regulation to modify the schedule of drugs.254 A 1971 regulation authorizes 
physicians to dispense the drugs in question “for a legitimate medical 
purpose.”255 The CSA also sets up a registry for physicians; only registered 
physicians may dispense regulated drugs.256 Finally, the CSA includes a 
provision confirming the continuing role of states in regulating in the area, 
calling for the displacement of state law only where “there is a positive 
conflict between that provision of this subchapter and that State law so that 
the two cannot consistently stand together.”257 
In 2001, the Attorney General issued an interpretive rule that cast 
doubt on the continued vitality of the ODWDA.258 The rule declared that 
“assisting suicide is not a ‘legitimate medical purpose’ within the meaning” 
of the Attorney General’s 1971 regulation.259 Dispensing the drugs in 
question, therefore, would constitute a violation of the CSA, and a 
physician who in fact dispensed such drugs under the ODWDA would put 
his or her registration at risk.260 Finally, the interpretive rule expressly 
endeavored to displace state law, explaining that “[t]he Attorney General’s 
conclusion applies regardless of whether state law authorizes or permits 
such conduct by practitioners or others.”261 
Would sovereign preemption state standing have provided a basis for 
Oregon’s standing in the Gonzales v. Oregon litigation?262 No, unless the 
doctrine extends to Executive Branch overenforcement of federal law. 
Undoubtedly the interpretive rule explicitly sought to preempt state law. 
But Oregon’s complaint was not that the Executive Branch was 
underenforcing the CSA but rather that it was overenforcing it by extending 
its reach to apply to actions otherwise protected under the ODWDA. 
 
 253 Id. § 829(a)–(b). 
 254 Id. § 811(a). 
 255 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2016). 
 256 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 822–824 (2012). 
 257 Id. § 903. 
 258 Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607 (Nov. 9, 2001). 
 259 Id. at 56,608. 
 260 Id. 
 261 Id. 
 262 In the actual case, the Supreme Court did not address standing. See Grove, supra note 4, at 873 
n.118. The district court did address the state’s standing, and concluded that standing was proper. See 
Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1087 (D. Or. 2002). However, the Ninth Circuit easily found 
that intervening health care practitioners had standing, see Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1121 & 
n.2 (9th Cir. 2004), which obviated the need to address any other plaintiff’s standing. The Supreme 
Court presumably relied on this conclusion. 
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Indeed, the actual procedural history of the Gonzales v. Oregon litigation 
highlights one of the reasons I offered above for why sovereign preemption 
state standing is not needed in cases of alleged Executive Branch 
overenforcement: In the actual litigation, there were—as one would 
generally expect in the setting of overenforcement—private parties who 
could establish standing under the traditional test.263 
4. A Lawsuit by Nebraska and Oklahoma Against the Federal 
Government Arising out of Colorado’s Decriminalization of 
Recreational Marijuana 
Finally, consider a lawsuit that has yet to be brought but that would 
arise out of the same dispute that has generated the Nebraska v. Colorado 
litigation.264 In the actual case, Nebraska and Oklahoma sought to sue 
Colorado under the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, alleging that 
Colorado’s legalization of recreational marijuana265 had led to an influx of 
marijuana into the plaintiff States and had generated high criminal 
enforcement costs.266 The Court declined the plaintiff Sates’ request to 
exercise its original jurisdiction.267 One could imagine, however, that the 
plaintiff States might have thought of suing additionally (or instead) the 
U.S. Attorney General, given that the Attorney General’s response to 
Colorado’s legalization decision suggested as a matter of policy that 
enforcement resources should be deployed with an eye to local legalization 
laws.268 If Oklahoma had sued the Attorney General, would sovereign 
preemption state standing apply? 
No, the theory of sovereign preemption state standing outlined in this 
Article would not grant Oklahoma standing in this hypothetical litigation. 
To see this, note that the plaintiff States could not allege federal preemption 
 
 263 See text accompanying supra note 220. 
 264 Nebraska v. Colorado, 135 S. Ct. 2070 (2015) (invitation for Solicitor General to file a brief 
expressing the views of the United States); see also Nebraska v. Colorado 136 S. Ct. 1034 (2016) 
(denial of motion for leave to file a bill of complaint). 
 265 Were the issue the legalization of medical marijuana, there clearly would be no sovereign 
preemption state standing, because Congress itself has approved—indeed to some degree mandated—
the underenforcement of federal criminal drug laws in that context. Specifically, through riders to 
appropriations bills, Congress has since 2014 prohibited the Department of Justice from using any of 
the funds allocated to it in a way that would “prevent” a state from implementing state laws “that 
authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana.” United States v. 
McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1169 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); id. at 1179 (allowing criminal 
defendants an injunction against prosecutors based on these funding restrictions). 
 266 See Complaint at ¶¶ 7, 54–68, Nebraska v. Colorado, 135 S. Ct. 2070 (2015) (No. 144, Orig.). 
 267 Nebraska v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1034 (2016). 
 268 See, e.g., Todd Grabarsky, Conflicting Federal and State Medical Marijuana Policies: A Threat 
to Cooperative Federalism, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 23–24 (2013). 
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of their laws; rather, they would allege—and indeed have alleged—that 
federal law effected preemption of a sister state’s law. 
To be sure, the plaintiff States could allege that the Executive Branch 
had unilaterally decided to underenforce governing federal law. But the 
ability to allege a problem of horizontal separation of powers, while 
necessary, is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of sovereign 
preemption state standing. Sovereign preemption state standing rests on the 
notion that the Executive Branch is underutilizing powers that the states 
delegated to the federal government and that Congress in turn directed the 
Executive Branch to employ. In contrast, preconstitutionally, no state had 
the legal power to restrict a neighboring state’s exercise of its own police 
powers. Indeed, as the Court noted in its 1906 decision in Missouri v. 
Illinois, the interstate lawsuit that the Constitution created stands as a 
substitute for diplomacy or the use of force.269 Since a state never had the 
power and, therefore, did not delegate to the federal government the power, 
to compel a sister state to exert its own police powers, neither does it have 
sovereign preemption state standing to challenge the federal government’s 
failure to inhibit the sister state’s behavior in this regard. 
In so concluding, I do not mean to argue that there is no theory under 
which the plaintiff States might have standing to sue the federal 
government. Perhaps there are other theories of standing that might 
apply.270 My point is simply to show that sovereign preemption state 
standing does not apply and, in so doing, to demonstrate the limits of the 
doctrine. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have introduced and explicated the doctrine of 
sovereign preemption state standing. First, the state must allege that the 
Executive Branch has underenforced the federal law in a way that is 
inconsistent with a governing statute. Second, the state must be able to 
 
 269 200 U.S. 496, 518 (1906) (describing a lawsuit between states as “a situation which, if it arose 
between independent sovereignties, might lead to war”). In effect, the Constitution removes a state’s 
prerogative to go to war with another state but creates for it the opportunity to sue the other state in 
court. 
 270 Of note in this regard is the Court’s suggestion in Massachusetts v. EPA that states effectively 
surrender their power to invade sister states in order to address transboundary issues. That may indeed 
in some sense obligate the Executive Branch to apply federal law so as to minimize transboundary 
effects. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. Alternatively, Congress might create a statutory 
cause of action to cover interstate spillovers from marijuana legalization. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 7426 (2012) 
(Clean Air Act provision empowering states and subdivisions thereof to petition EPA for relief to the 
extent that a stationary source or a group of stationary sources in another state allegedly emits regulated 
pollutants to a degree that the emissions contribute significantly to the petitioning entity’s failure to  
comply with federal air quality standards). 
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point to preemption of state law; in particular, either the preemption of state 
law must be obvious and clear from a federal statute or the federal 
government must have previously sought, or be concurrently seeking, to 
preempt state law. In addition, there must be a nexus between area of 
preemption and the area in which the Executive Branch is allegedly 
underenforcing federal law. 
Sovereign preemption state standing rests on a functional 
understanding of the injury a state suffers when the federal government 
precludes it from regulating in an area and then the Executive Branch 
provides underenforcement of the governing federal statutory law. The 
doctrine squares well with precedent and makes sense of some precedent 
that has to this point flummoxed lower courts and commentators. Sovereign 
preemption state standing complements other settings where states have 
standing to sue the federal government. Finally, the doctrine can be 
overlaid with various prudential standing doctrines, which further would 
narrow the scope of the doctrine.  
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